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NOTE
EDUCATIONAL VOUCHERS AND THE
RELIGION CLAUSES UNDER AGOSTINI:
RESURRECTION, INSURRECTION AND A
NEW DIRECTION
It was over twenty-five years ago when Nobel Prize-winning
economist Milton Friedman put forth the idea of providing school
children and their parents with monetary vouchers from the state to
enable them to choose among public and private schools. The theory
was simple and seemingly foolproof in our open market economy.
By providing parents and students with a choice, schools would have
to compete for students and, thus, would be compelled by the market
to operate more effectively and efficiently.!
Friedman felt that any conflicts in ideology, such as religion,
would be resolved through competition. Taxpayers, administrators
and even the Supreme Court, however, did not agree. Not long after
Friedman proposed the voucher idea, the Supreme Court invalidated
an attempt to provide state aid to parochial schools as violative of the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.2 Thus began a long
stream of challenges to programs that channeled public benefits into
parochial schools and the Court's attempt to reconcile these programs
with constitutional principles. Vouchers are a relatively new trend in
this area and have yet to be specifically subjected to scrutiny under
the federal Constitution by the Supreme Court.
This Note attempts to trace Establishment Clause and Free Exer-
cise Clause jurisprudence, the issues that arise in voucher programs
and how current developments in Establishment Clause analysis may
pave the way for implementation of these and other educational re-
forms. Part I traces the analysis of state aid to parochial schools un-
der the Establishment Clause beginning with the three-part test set
SSee MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 85-107 (1962).
2 See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. (1947) (upholding a New Jersey law reimbursing
parents for school transportation costs); Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A Constitu-
tional Analysis, 28 COLuM. LL. & Soc. PROBS. 423,424 (1995).
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forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman,3 still in use by the Court, albeit with sig-
nificant modifications. Part II describes the changes in this analysis
since the Supreme Court overruled a prior decision in Agostini v.
Felton,4 by allowing public school teachers to provide remedial edu-
cation in parochial schools. Part I also analyzes how the modifica-
tions made in Establishment Clause theory by the Agostini decision
may resurrect vouchers and other educational aid programs. Recent
holdings by Wisconsin, Ohio and Vermont state courts interpreting
Agostini illustrate this potential resurrection. Part III addresses the
limits of the Agostini decision as applied to voucher programs in light
of independent state constitutional interpretations. Such interpreta-
tions, should they be too stringent, may infringe upon the other half of
the religion clause: the right to free exercise. Part IV briefly outlines
the history of the Free Exercise Clause and its applicability to vouch-
ers and educational aid in general. It also explains the use of Free
Exercise Clause challenges as a means of upholding voucher systems
and how courts can resolve the conflict between the religion clauses.
Finally, Part V concludes with the future of voucher programs and
constitutional scrutiny; what types of programs will be maintained
and what types will fall. Through this discussion, courts and legisla-
tures will be provided with the framework to implement Friedman's
voucher proposal while still maintaining fundamental constitutional
values.
I. EDUCATIONAL FUNDING UNDER THE FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE
A. The Road to Agostini
While modem strict separationists often cite to "founding father"
Thomas Jefferson as the creator of the idea that there should be a
"strict wall" of separation between church and state under the First
Amendment,5 political history posits otherwise. The first U.S. Con-
gress established a national day of public prayer and thanksgiving and
implemented a system of publicly supported military chaplains, while
the Bill of Rights was still in the drafting process. 6 Even the earlyNorthwest Ordinance provided for a system of schools to encourage
3 403 U.S. 602 (1971). But see Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Gmmet, 512 U.S. 687
(1994) (resolving Establishment Clause issues without reference to the Lemon test); Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (same).
4 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
5 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins and Stephen S.
Nelson (Jan. 1, 1802), in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 518-19 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1943).
6 See Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: Religious Freedom and Educational Opportu-
nity Under Constitutional Federalism, 15 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 113, 120-21 (1996).
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"[r]eligion, morality and knowledge... [as these are] necessary to
good government.' 7 While the Framers were strict in their opposition
to the church's involvement in government, they were equally vehe-
ment in their opposition to government's involvement in the church. 8
This opposition did not evolve from any anti-religious sentiment, but
rather from expectations of free belief and discussion of all religions. 9
Given this historical background, it was not until this century that
the federal judiciary became involved in conflicts over constitutional
liberties, including the Establishment Clause controversy over educa-
tional funding. 10 A system of parochial schools, mostly Catholic, had
flourished in the late nineteenth century, often educating poor and
immigrant families.11 Although some states tried to eliminate such
schools in favor of a publicly educated citizenry, these attempts were
made in vain.' 2 Instead, there developed a growing sentiment in favor
of accessibility to public services for privately schooled children. In
1947, the Supreme Court first addressed the Establishment Clause
implications of such access in Everson v. Board of Education.13 Here,
a New Jersey law reimbursed parents for the costs of transporting
their children to school.14  This reimbursement was available to all
parents, even those with children attending private or parochial
schools. 5 In a five to four decision, the Court upheld the law, making
the now-famous comparison to other government services that are
available to religious organizations such as "ordinary police and fire
protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways and
sidewalks.' 16  However, even in upholding the law, the Court was
7 Id. at 121 (citations omitted).
8 See David Futterman, School Choice and the Religion Clauses: The Law and Politics of
Public Aid to Private Parochial Schools, 81 GEo. L.. 711, 712 (1993) (describing Madison's
concept of "freedom of religion" as having a dual purpose); see also Viteritti, supra note 6, at
121 (discussing the "substantial disagreement among the Framers").
9 See Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), in THE
COMPLETE JEFFERSON, supra note 5, at 946-47 ("[No man shall be compelled to frequent or
support any religious worship.... but... all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to
maintain, their opinions in matters of religion .... ").
1 See Futterman, supra note 8, at 712 n.7 (noting that no state or federal laws were struck
down as violative of the Freedom of Religion Clause for a period of 150 years).
11 See Viteritti, supra note 6, at 145-46 (describing how Catholic Church leaders in many
large cities set up schools to "resist the blatant Prostentantism" in public schools at that time). It
should also be noted that the Blaine Amendment of 1875 which would have constitutionally
prohibited states from supporting parochial schools failed by a very narrow margin. See id. at
144-45. This anti-Catholic sentiment led to the establishment of separate Catholic Schools. IL
at 146.
12 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (holding that parents have a
right to choose private over public education for their children).
13 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
14 See id. at 18.
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quick to note that it would not "approve the slightest breach" in Jef-
ferson's "wall between church and state. 17 In this first case, the
Court went so far as to say that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or
small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
... in whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion." 8
While this statement became the rallying cry of separationists in sub-
sequent educational funding cases, 19 some commentators felt this de-
cision was grounded in free exercise theory rather than the Establish-
ment Clause.20 Free exercise theory would require that public enti-
tlements such as transportation not be abridged or denied based on
religious affiliations.21
Despite its seemingly groundbreaking rationale, the Everson deci-
sion provided little guidance for future Establishment Clause analysis.
Such guidance did not come until twenty-four years later in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,22 in which the Court fashioned a three-prong test to strike
down two state statutes authorizing the use of state funds to remit
portions of secular teachers' salaries to parochial schools. 3  The
Lemon Court set out the test as follows: "First, the statute must have a
secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect
must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the
statute must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with religion."' 4
The Court was quick to conclude that the statutes at issue were aimed
at educational quality, thus meeting the secular purpose required in
the first prong.25 However, the Lemon Court did not address the "ef-
fects" prong as it held the "excessive entanglement" created by the
statutes was sufficient to violate the third prong and render them un-
7 Id. at 18.
1 Id. at 16.
19 See e.g., Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
780 (citing Everson in striking down aid programs); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373, 392 (same).
20 See Futterman, supra note 8, at 715-16 (claiming the Everson Court's decision "hinted"
at concern for free exercise rights); Viteritti, supra note 6, at 130 (asserting that the Everson
Court balanced the "Establishment and Free Exercise Clause in favor of the latter"). But see
Hon. Paul B. Higginbotham, Address at "Public Dollars, Religious Schools: Where Do We Go
from Here?", Symposium by Case Western Reserve University and Committee for Public Edu-
cation and Religious Liberty (Oct. 24, 1997) [hereinafter PEARL Symposium] (video transcript
available in CWRU Law Library) (describing the Court's decision as "Establishment Clause
analysis").
21 See Viteritti, supra note 6, at 130. See also supra notes 316-342 and accompanying text
for a discussion of equal access fundamental rights.
2 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
2 See id. at 609 (affirming District Court's holding that Rhode Island teacher salary sup-
plement violated the Establishment Clause); see also id at 611 (reversing the District Court's
holding that Pennsylvania's parochial school reimbursement statute did not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause).
24 Id. at 612-13 (citation omitted).
2 See id. at 613.
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constitutional. 26 This entanglement came in three forms. First, the
display of religious symbols, from in the classrooms to the mission
statements of the schools' handbooks, made the character of the bene-
fits a pervasively Catholic one. 27 Second, although many lay teachers
insisted that they did not inject religion into their classes,28 the Court
found that those teachers were nonetheless part of, and subject to, a
system that inculcated a certain faith.29 In addition, the amount of
government surveillance necessary to insure that teachers receiving
state aid would be performing solely secular instruction would create
an excessive entanglement between the state and the sectarian
school.30 Third, the Court was concerned that allocating state money
to parochial schools would lead to political divisiveness along relig-
ious lines, 31 a result that is "one of the princi 2al evils against which
the First Amendment was intended to protect.
'
,
Despite the Court's emphasis on the "entanglement" prong of the
Lemon test, subsequent challenges have usually turned on the analysis
under the "primary effects" prong, with mixed results.33 A conflict in
jurisprudence arose when two virtually identical tax credit plans
achieved different resolutions under the Lemon test.34 Following this
contradiction were two cases in which the Court relaxed its analysis
under the "effects" prong,35 setting the stage for the Court to overrule
2 See id at 613-14.
27 See id. at 616. The principals in all but two schools benefited by the program were nuns,
and only one-third of all elementary school teachers in parochial schools were lay persons. See
id. at 617. Handbooks emphasized that "[r]eligious formation is not confined to formal courses;
nor is it restricted to a single subject area." Id. at 618.
28 See id at 618.
29 See id; see also Kirk A. Kennedy, Note, Opportunity Declined: The Supreme Court Re-
fuses to Jettison the Lemon Test in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 113 S. Ct. 2462
(1993), 73 NEB. L REV. 408, 416 (1994) (defining "entanglement" under Lemon as "the neces-
sity of preventing 'the danger that a teacher under religious control and discipline poses' to the
desired goal of church-state separation") (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 617).
30 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
31 See id at 622; see also Futterman, supra note 8, at 717.32 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 621 (citations omitted).
33 See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (upholding Minnesota tax deduction for
educational expenses on the grounds that the secular benefits outweighed the possible religious
effects); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (strik-
ing down New York tuition reimbursement and tax credits to nonpublic school families as ad-
vancing religion); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (allowing public schools to
loan textbooks to parochial students as beneficial to students, rather than schools).
3 Compare Mueller, 463 U.S. at 404 (upholding educational expense tax deductions), with
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 772-74 (striking down private educational expenses tax credit).
35 See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (permitting religious in-
stitutions to receive the benefits of social welfare programs as long as such services are gener-
ally available to all institutions, both secular and nonsecular); Witters v. Washington Dep't of
Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 486-88 (1986) (holding that the use of state aid for the edu-
cation of the blind did not violate the Establishment Clause even though that aid ended up in the
coffers of a religious institution).
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twelve years of Establishment Clause analysis in Agostini v. Felton.36
Two years after Lemon, the Court laid down a strict interpretation
of the "effects" prong in Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist.37  Here, the Court struck down a New York pro-
gram that used state money to provide for the maintenance of paro-
chial schools and tuition reimbursement for students of low-income
parents.38 The program also provided tax credits for the benefit of
other parents who did not qualify for such reimbursement. 39 The Ny-
quist Court was not convinced of a secular effect merely because the
aid was directed at parents and not schools. 40 There was much con-
cern about fungibility, that public money could be used to free other
funds to be used for religious activities.4 ' It was deemed irrelevant
that the amount of assistance received, fifteen percent, was signifi-
cantly less than the class time required to be devoted to non-religious
studies.42 Most importantly, however, the statute at issue made bene-
fits. available only to private schools and parents of children in those
schools.43 The Nyquist Court stated that to pass the effects prong of
Lemon, benefits would need to be "made available generally without
regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-non-public nature of
the institution benefited." 44 Because the statute was limited to private
school students, the potential effects of the statute were broad enough
to impermissibly advance religion, and the Court did not need to ad-
dress the entanglement issue.
45
36 521 U.S. 203 (1997). See Memorandum from Stephen K. Green, Legal Director, Ameri-
cans United, Analysis of Agostini [v]. Felton 1 (on file with Cleveland ACLU Office) (noting
that the case was "highly significant" as "[t]he Supreme Court rarely overturns its own rul-
ings"). But see Higginbotham, supra note 20 (noting that the incomplete record in Agostini may
have played an important role in the decision); Gary Simpson, Address at PEARL Symposium,
supra note 20 (arguing that the Agostini holding does not reflect sound Establishment Clause
analysis).
37 413 U.S. 756 (1973).38 See id. at 779-80, 88-89 (overturning New York programs having the potential to advance
the religious institutions' messages through the use of public funds).
39 See id. at 757.
40 See id. at 781.
41 See id. at 774-80; see also Futterman, supra note 8, at 718 ("T]he state [must] be 'cer-
tain' that religious functions were not publicly subsidized.").42See Futterman, supra note 8, at 718 ("[A] mere statistical judgment will not suffice as a
guarantee that state funds will not be used to finance religious education.") (citing Nyquist, 413
U.S. at 778).
41 See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 759, 764 (invalidating a statute providing financial assistance to
non-public schools for maintenance and repair as well as tax benefits to parents of children
attending those schools); see also Andrew A. Adams, Cleveland, School Choice, and "Lavs
Respecting an Establishment of Religion," 2 TEX. REV. L. POL 165, 178 (1997) (arguing that
Ohio's pilot program ensures state neutrality while providing benefits to citizens who wish to
attend private institutions).
44 Nyquist, 413 U.S at 782 n.38; see also Adams, supra note 43, at 178 (stating that the stat-
ute in Nyquist failed because the benefits were not available to a wide enough group).
4s See Futterman, supra note 8, at 718.
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Ten years later, the Court ignored much of the rhetoric in Nyquist
in upholding an education tax deduction in Minnesota in Mueller v.
Allen. 6 Here, the Court made the "vital" distinction between this de-
duction and the tax credit in Nyquist on the grounds that this deduc-
tion was available to all parents, not just parochial school parents. 47
However, the Mueller Court went further in loosening the strict Ny-
quist interpretation of a neutral effect.48 The Court stated that chan-
neling aid through parents was significant: "[Where... aid to paro-
chial schools is available only as the result of decisions of individual
parents no 'imprimatur of state approval' can be deemed to have been
conferred on any particular religion .... 49 This was in spite of the
fact that virtually all of the benefit of the tax deduction went to sec-
tarian school families as there were no tuition costs for public school
parents to deduct.50 In contrast to Nyquist, the Mueller decision did
not address fungibility problems or the issue of whether the program
provided an incentive to parents to send their children to sectarian
schools. This set the stage for future cases in which state aid funneled
through parents but nonetheless arriving in parochial school coffers
could be upheld without significantly altering Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.
In what some academics have termed "the erosion of Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence," 51 the Supreme Court upheld two separate
instances of pubic aid used at parochial schools. These cases signaled
a shift away fiom the separationist stance of Nyquist, in favor of a
turn toward an increased reliance on the neutrality analysis of Muel-
ler.52  In Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the
Blind,53 the Court upheld the use of a state vocational scholarship at a
Christian seminary,54 and in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School
District,55 it upheld the use of a federal grant to provide a sign-
46 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
47 See ia at 398.
48 See Viteritti, supra note 6, at 136 (discussing Justice Rehnquist's suggestion to relax the
"effects" prong of the Lemon test).49Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399 (citations omitted).
'0 See Futterman, supra note 8, at 723.
51 Higginbotham, supra note 20; see also Harlan A. Loeb & Debbie N. Kaminer, God,
Money, and Schools: Voucher Programs Impugn the Separation of Church and State, 30 J.
MARSHALL L. REv 1, 7-8 (1996) (describing post-Nyquist cases as turning away from earlier
precepts); Stick, supra note 2, at 447 ("[T]he Court has since diverged from the separationist
path....").
S2 See Frank R Kemerer, The Constitutionality of School Vouchers, 101 EDUC. L. REP. 17,
21-22 (1995).
53 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
5 See id. at 482 (explaining that when state funds are provided to an individual who in turn
uses them at a religious institution, the state is not thereby responsible for funding that institu-
tion).
55 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
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language interpreter at a Catholic high school.56
While both decisions emphasized the fact that public moneys
flowing to religious institutions were matters of private choices of
individuals,57 the Court significantly diverged from traditional analy-
sis in upholding these programs. First, in Witters, the Court used em-
pirical evidence to find that the program at issue passed the "effects"
prong of Lemon.58  As no one else had used the blind vocational
scholarship to attend a religious institution, this program did not
impermissibly advance religion. 59 This was in significant contrast to
the Court's refusal in both Nyquist and Mueller to use empirical data
in its decisions.60
More notable was the Court's indirect reliance on the Mueller
neutrality assessment.61 In Witters, the concurrence stated more di-
rectly: "Mueller makes the answer clear: state programs that are
wholly neutral in offering educational assistance to a class defined
without reference to religion do not violate the second part of the
[Lemon] test because any aid to religion results from the private
choices of individual beneficiaries." 62 Similarly, the Zobrest Court, in
affirming the neutrality analysis in Mueller, claimed its analysis was
even more straightforward than the Witters analysis. In Zobrest, the
government was offering a neutral service-aid to the disabled-as
part of a general program that was not skewed toward religion and
would only "benefit" the sectarian school because of a private paren-
tal decision.63 These two holdings virtually closed out the argument
that "the concept of a loan to individuals is a transparent fiction"64
6 See i at 3 (holding that when funds for disabled students' education find their way into a
religious school, there is not necessarily an Establishment Clause violation).
57 See ih at 10; Witters, 474 U.S. at 488; see also Stick, supra note 2, at 448 (analyzing the
Court's approach to deciding Witters).
'a See Witters, 474 U.S. at 488
59 See id at 489; see also Stick, supra note 2, at 448 (questioning whether the empirical
analysis in Witters would survive close review).
60 See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983) (refusing to address the fact that over
95% of the tax deductions were taken by parochial school parents); Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 777-78 (1973) (refusing to recognize that the per-
centage of the state grant was significantly less than the percentage of time devoted to secular
education).
61 Cf. Witters, 474 U.S. at 488 (noting that aid only flows to religious institutions as the re-
suit of private choice); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399 (noting that no imprimatur of state approval is
inferred when aid is a result of private choice).
62 Witters, 474 U.S. at 490-91 (Powell, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
63 See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 12-14 (1993). The Court also
noted that, unlike Witters, no funds from the state-run program at issue would ever find their
way into the coffers of sectarian schools. See id.
64 School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 396 (1985) (quoting Wolman v.
Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 264 (1976)); see also Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 785 (referring to "ingenious
plans for channeling state aid to sectarian schools" that may eventually result in widespread
disregard for the Establishment Clause).
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and paved the way for private choice to be an important component of
any "neutral" aid program.
65
A third instance in which the Court has diverged from the tradi-
tional Establishment Clause theory is evidenced in Zobrest. For the
first time since the Nyquist era,66 the Court rejected the idea that a
public employee working on parochial school grounds could not
avoid inculcating religion into his/her work,67 stating that the presence
of such employee "neither add[ed] to nor subtract[ed] from [the per-
vasively sectarian] environment" in which a parent chooses to place
his/her child.68 While neither the Zobrest nor the Witters Court spe-
cifically relied upon the Free Exercise Clause as a basis for its deci-
sion, there may have been concern that entitlements, especially those
to the disabled students in those cases, were being denied on the basis
of religious affiliation. 69 However, there was no mention of this con-
cern in either opinion.
B. Agostini v. Felton: Reversal and Resurrection
Prior to 1997, the state of Establishment Clause jurisprudence had
been deemed by some to be in "hopeless disarray,"70 but the reversal
of a twelve-year-old Nyquist-era decision indicates the current Su-
preme Court's intent to weaken the Lemon test in favor of a more
neutral stance toward sectarian education. In Agostini v. Felton,7 1 the
Court vacated a 1985 injunction that prevented the New York City
Board of Education from providing remedial education teachers to
disadvantaged students on parochial school grounds.72 The program
at issue was mandated and funded under Title I of the federal Ele-
mentary and Secondary Education Act ("Title F'), 73 and was available
to both public and private school students, although funds to private
65 See infra Part I(B) (discussing Agostini and direct aid to parochial schools).
6See, e.g., Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414 (1985) (holding that teachers in such
schools may be influenced by their pervasively sectarian nature); Ball, 473 U.S. at 375 (same).
67 See Leading Cases, Public Funding of Special Education in Parochial Schools, 111
HARV. L REV. 279, 282 (1997) [hereinafter Public Funding]; Higginbotham, supra note 20.
68 Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13.
69 See Viteritti, supra note 6, at 138. But see Id. at 142 n.150 (citing LAWRENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-8, at 1204 (2d ed. 1988)).
70 Rosenberger v. Rectors & Bd. of Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 861 (1995) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring). In fact, the Supreme Court itself has admitted that in Establishment Clause jurisprudence,
it has "sacrificed clarity and predictability for flexibility .... " Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
7, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
72 See id. at 207.(vacating the injunction the Court imposed in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
402 (1985)). Aguilar's companion case involved a similar remedial program employing public
school teachers which was struck down. See School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985).
73 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-6514 (1994) (declaring it to be the policy of Congress "that a high
quality education for all individuals ... [is] a societal good").
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students were limited to those services that were "secular, neutral and
nonideological." 74 After the 1985 injunction was granted, services
were provided in classroom vans parked outside religious schools
rather than on the premises.75 This cost the school district an extra
$7.9 million per year and precluded thirty-five percent of private
school children from receiving the entitled services. 6
The original 1985 injunction, granted in Aguilar v. Felton,77 en-
joining these services, was based upon a violation of the "effects"
prong of Lemon which the Court held could not be remedied without
further violation of the "excessive entanglement" prong.78 In Aguilar,
the Court held that publicly-paid teachers working on parochial
school premises created a symbolic union between church and state
which "convey[ed] a message of government endorsement... of re-
ligion ' 79 in violation of the "effects" prong of Lemon. Furthermore,
the Court expressed concern about teachers subtly conforming their
teaching to the pervasively sectarian environment.80 To alleviate
these concerns, the school district had implemented several controls
such as making teachers accountable only to public school supervi-
sors, removing religious symbols from Title I classrooms and
monthly unannounced monitoring visits to those classrooms.81
Nonetheless, the Aguilar Court held that the amount of monitoring
necessary to ensure against a violation of Lemon's "effects" prong
was so comprehensive that such monitoring, by itself, violated the
"excessive entanglement" prong of Lemon; thus, the Court enjoined
the entire program.82
However, in light of the decisions in Mueller, Witters, and espe-
cially Zobrest, the theoretical underpinnings of Aguilar were ripe for
review and reversal in 1997. In reversing the twelve-year-old injunc-
tion, the Agostini Court maintained use of the first two prongs of the
Lemon test, "secular purpose" and "primary effects," but also made
three significant modifications to the analysis under the "effects"
prong.83 First, it reinforced the "neutrality" standard of neither ad-
74 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 201 (quoting 20 U.S.C § 6321(a)(2)).
75 See id at 213.
76 See id
77 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
78 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613; supra Part I(B)(3) (discussing the third prong of Lemon).
79 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 220 (quoting School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373,
389 (1985)).80 See id at 219 (citing Ball, 473 U.S. at 388).
81 See Public Funding, supra note 67, at 280 (citing Agostini, 521 U.S. at 212).
82 See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409. While this argument may appear to be circular, it highlights
the fact that some programs can not pass the Establishment Clause standard because they can
not be "neutralized" without significant interference from state goverments.
83 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222-23 (stating that while general Establishment Clause princi-
ples since Aguilar had not changed, the criteria used to assess the effect of the aid had). But see
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vancing or inhibiting religion that had been applied in Mueller, Wit-
ters and Zobrest,84 as contrasted with the separationist view of pro-
hibiting all aid to religion espoused in Nyquist, Aguilar and similar
cases.8 5 Second, it focused on private choice as the primary vehicle
for aid to parochial schools, thus eliminating the need to determine
whether such aid was "direct and substantial" or "indirect and inci-
dental" as required in previous cases.86 Finally, the Court virtually
eliminated the "excessive entanglement" prong of the Lemon test,
choosing instead to incorporate it into the "effects" analysis.
1. The Neutrality Stance
In its decisions striling down public funding to parochial schools,
the Court repeatedly referred to the difficulty in separating secular
from religious instruction for funding purposes because of the over-
arching mission of parochial schools to inculcate religion.8 7 In Agos-
tini, however, the Court saw no need to address this dilemma.88 The
Court noted that Zobrest had "abandoned the presumption... that the
placement of public employees on parochial school grounds... con-
stitutes a symbolic union between government and religion."8 9 In
fact, the Agostini Court went so far as to call the assumption that
teachers would be pressured by the pervasively sectarian nature of the
school an "antiquated notion[] of 'taint,' [which] would indeed exalt
form over substance." 90 The Agostini Court relied heavily upon the
record in reaching this conclusion, noting that no teachers had at-
tempted to inculcate religious values and that the location of the class-
room was irrelevant to what went on inside.91 However, the Agostini
Memorandum to Stephen K. Green, supra note 36, at 4 (emphasizing that Ball's basic presump-
tion that parochial schools are pervasively sectarian institutions remains unchanged).
84 See supra notes 46-69 and accompanying text.
85 See supra notes 37-45, 77-82 and accompanying text.
86 See, e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993); Witters v.
Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487 (1986); School Dist. of Grand
Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S 373, 394 n.12 (1985); Mueller v. Allen 463 U.S. 388, 399 (1983).
87 See Ball, 473 U.S. at 394; Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780; Higginbotham, supra note 20. But
see Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968) (noting that the Court could not agree
whether all teaching in a sectarian school is religious or that the processes of secular and relig-
ious education are impossibly intertwined).
88 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 222 ("Our more recent cases have undermined the assumptions
upon which [Ball] and [Aguilar] relied.").
9 Id.
90 l (citing Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 13). Nor can it be presumed that a teacher would be pres-
sured by the sectarian surroundings to inculcate religion into their lectures. See id This belief is
contrary to that of academics and some justices who contend that elementary school students are
more impressionable than college students. See Loeb & Kaminer, supra note 51, at 9. They also
point out that while religious indoctrination is not the primary purpose of religious colleges, it is
the primary mission of parochial elementary schools. See Higginbotham, supra note 20; Loeb &
Kaminer, supra note 51, at 9.
9' See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 227-30.
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Court made it explicitly clear that neither its holding nor that of the
Zobrest Court are limited to their facts, and that Aguilar and Ball
were now overruled.
Rather than sorting out empirical evidence of secular and religious
functions to determine neutrality, the Agostini Court instead analyzed
the class benefited as a whole. The need for a neutral class of benefi-
ciaries arose out of prior decisions finding that certain aid programs
could provide incentives to choose religious education.93 However,
the Court, in later decisions has noted that as long as the benefits are
available to a broad class on a religiously neutral basis, the fact that
parochial schools or parents of parochial students may receive these
benefits does not create such an incentive.94 By focusing its analysis
on the potential class of beneficiaries rather than the actual recipients,
the Court could dispense with any empirical discussion of participa-
tion statistics or dollar amounts of aid, consistent with Mueller's
holding that a program's constitutionality should not hinge on com-
pilations of statistics that can change from year to year,95 even where
those statistics show a disproportionate benefit to sectarian schools or
parents.
96
2. Focus on Private Choice
Prior to Agostini, the Court focused on whether the benefit re-
ceived by the religious school was direct and substantial or indirect
92 See id. at 225 ("Our refusal to limit [Zobrest] to its facts despite its rationale does not, in
our view, amount to a 'misreading' of precedent."). But see Loeb & Kaminer, supra note 51, at
9 (arguing that Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Zobrest was based on specific language of the
federal statute). The Agostini Court did not, however, overrule its holdings in Aguilar and Ball
that parochial teachers are more likely to inculcate religion into their teaching such that use of
government funds to pay these teachers still would violate the "effects" prong of Lemon. See
Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407, 420-21 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (noting that Agostini left
portions of Ball in place); Memorandum from Stephen K. Green, supra note 36, at 4.
93 See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,786 (1973).
94 See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10; Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474
U.S. 481, 488 (1986). Some commentators have held that true neutrality would require the state
to fund parochial and secular schools equally, so as to favor neither. See Donald L Beschle, The
Conservative as Liberal: The Religions Clauses, Liberal Neutrality and the Approach of Justice
O'Connor, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 151, 185 (1987) (proposing full funding of religious edu-
cation); George W. Dent, Jr., Of God and Caesar: The Free Exercise Rights of Public School
Students, 43 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 707,750-51 & n.210 (1993).
95 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 229-30 ("We would be loath to adopt a rule grounding the con-
stitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports .... ") (citing Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S.
388, 401 (1983)); see also Adams, supra note 43, at 198; Margaret A. Nero, The Cleveland
Scholarship and Tutoring Program: Why Voucher Programs Do Not Violate the Establishment
Clause, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1103, 1122 (1997) (discussing the neutrality and constitutionality of
providing funds to low-income families through scholarships in order to create equal educa-
tional opportunities).




and incidental. 97 It was generally unpersuaded by arguments that pri-
vate choice alone made the aid indirect, and thus within the realm of
permissible effect under Lemon.98 Agostini specifically rejected the
premise that any and all funds that directly aid the educational func-
tion of religious schools are invalid.9 9 Instead it focused on two
"new" criteria for evaluating the aid's effect: (1) whether the aid is
made available on a neutral basis to both religious and secular benefi-
ciaries, and (2) whether that beneficiary makes a private choice as to
the aid's religious/non-religious destination.
This focus on private choice will be the subject of much future de-
bate and litigation regarding educational funding. Previous decisions
had dismissed the choice arguments out of a concern for the fungibil-
ity of public funds used at religious schools. It was feared that such
funds would relieve religious schools of some expenses, thus freeing
those funds to be used for other, presumably religious, purposes. 00
Relying on Witters, the Agostini Court went to great lengths to ex-
plain that the program disbursements did not distinguish between
public and parochial school students' 0' and that monies did not flow
directly into parochial treasuries. 0 2 Also, the Agostini Court reiter-
ated an analogy described in Witters to illustrate how choice provides
a constitutional filter between the government and religious schools.
In the famous "paycheck analogy," Justice Marshall explained that a
state may issue a paycheck to an employee and the employee may
donate all of it to a religious institution with no constitutional im-
pediment; the fact that the state may know that the employee will do
this does not create such a barrier to its issuing the paycheck. 03 As
long as a real, independent choice exists between both religious and
97 See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10; Witters, 474 U.S. at 487; School Dist. of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373,394 n.12 (1985); Mueller, 463 U.S. at 399.
" See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 780 (holding that "direct aid in whatever form is invalid"). The
Nyquist Court was suspicious of the state's argument that parents were not "mere conduits" for
aid to be channeled into parochial schools. See id at 786; see also Adams, supra note 43, at
188-89 (discussing the evolution of neutrality in light of the significance of private choice as
seen through case law).
99 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 225 ("[We have departed from the rule relied on in Ball that all
government aid that directly assists the educational function of religious schools is invalid.").
'0 See i. at 250 (Souter, J., dissenting) (detailing the majority's alleged misinterpretation
and mischaracterization of the direct public funding available for religious schools).
iai See Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 (stating that vocational grants for the blind were "'made
available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of
the institution benefited"') (citation omitted). This is consistent with the holding in Mueller that
emphasized the tax credit's availability to a broad class of beneficiaries and not merely to paro-
chial school parents. See Mueller, 463 U.S. at 398.
"2 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 224-30.
103 See id. at 226 (citing Witters, 474 U.S. at 487); see also Adams, supra note 43, at 190
(discussing the evolution of neutrality in light of the significance of private choice as seen
through case law); cf. Dent, supra note 94, at 729 (using a welfare check donation to a church as
an analogy).
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nonreligious recipients, 1°4 the decision to use those funds for a relig-
ious purpose can not be attributed to the state and thus does not
amount to direct and substantial aid.105 This theory was given further
support in Rosenberger v. Rector & Board of Visitors of University of
Virginia,106 in which Justice O'Connor, author of the Agostini opin-
ion, stated that the conflict between the principles of neutrality and
anti-establishment can be resolved by relying on choice. 107
More specific to voucher programs, the Agostini decision did not
address the fungibility issue in detail, stating instead that the program
at issue provided remedial services from public employees that eligi-
ble students would receive regardless of where they chose to attend
school.108 The Agostini Court did not extend this analysis to compen-
sating parochial school employees for providing such services.
1°9
The Witters decision, however, may imply otherwise. The vocational
grant provided in that case was not restricted to secular use but rather
went directly into the seminary's treasury. 110 While Witters may be
distinguished as a case of post-secondary education,"1 it nonetheless
provides great hope to voucher proponents as much of prior Estab-
lishment Clause analysis had deemed it impossible to separate the
secular from the sectarian education function in assessing the "ef-
fects" prong of Lemon. 1 2 Now it appears that distinction is unneces-
sary as long as the aid is channeled through private choices, leading
several commentators to conclude that direct aid to religious enter-
prises is now constitutional.113
104 See Adams, supra note 43, at 190.
1o5 See id; see also Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226 (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,
509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993)).
'06 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
1o7 See id. at 848 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
108 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 229; see also Kemerer, supra note 52, at 22 (noting that the
Zobrest Court held that there would have been no Establishment Clause problem if public funds
had gone to the parents who had then used them to hire a private interpreter).
109 See Memorandum from Stephen K. Green, supra note 36, at 3-4. Such payment was
specifically struck down in Ball. See id. at 4. Furthermore, the Ball holding appears to have
been left untouched by Agostini. See supra notes 237-46 and accompanying text (discussing the
limitations in applying Agostini because of those portions of Ball that were still intact).
110 See generally Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 483
(1986) (failing to note any secular limitations on the grant of aid under the Washington statute);
see also Adams, supra note 43, at 192 (limiting concerns about fungibility to those cases where
aid does not involve private choice).
111 See supra notes 251-59 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial distinction be-
tween Establishment Clause analysis of elementary and post-secondary institutions).
112 See Public Funding, supra note 67, at 286 n.69 (citing Wolman v. Walters, 433 U.S. 229
(1977)).
113 See Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools-An Up-
date, 75 CAL. L. REv. 5, 13 (1987) ("[V]ouchers are now valid but, on the other hand, if aid is
provided directly to the schools, it will usually be held invalid. That is where the law stands.");
Public Funding, supra note 67, at 286. But see Futterman, supra note 8, at 732 (concluding that
tuition vouchers are fundamentally at odds with the Establishment Clause); Loeb & Kaminer,
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3. Disappearance of the Excessive Entanglement Prong
A third significant aspect of the Agostini decision is its virtual
dismissal of the "excessive entanglement" prong of Lemon. While
the original Aguilar decision was concerned with the amount of
monitoring that would be necessary to uphold separationism,114 the
Agostini Court, in dismissing the assumption that public school teach-
ers will succumb to the pervasive sectarian nature of the parochial
school in their instruction of students, also dismissed the need for ex-
cessive monitoring to alleviate such risk.115 The Court also summarily
dismissed concerns about administrative cooperation between public
school teachers and the parochial schools in which they work as well
as dangers of political divisiveness. 6 Both of these, the Court stated,
would be present regardless of whether the Title I services were of-
fered on- or off-campus and thus they could not be considered "ex-
cessive" under Lemon. 17 Less obvious, but more striking, was the
Agostini Court's subtle incorporation of the "entanglement" prong
into the "effects" prong. In analyzing the "entanglement" prong, the
Agostini Court stated that "the factors we use to assess whether an
entanglement is excessive.., are similar to the factors we use to ex-
amine 'effect' .. 8 While recognizing that entanglement is "sig-
nificant," the Court preferred to "treat it ... as an aspect of the in-
quiry into a statute's effect."119 This would appear to imply that once
a program has passed the analysis under the "effects" prong, an inde-
pendent analysis under "entanglement" would be unnecessary, as any
"excessive" entanglement would advance or inhibit religion in viola-
tion of the "effects" prong. This incorporation, combined with the
rejection of several assumptions vital to the separationist view of Es-
tablishment Clause analysis, indicates that the Court may be much
more open to public dollars indirectly flowing to private schools 20
supra note 51, at 37 ("[N]o matter how they are analyzed, voucher plans violate [the U.S. Con-
stitution] .... "); Stick, supra note 2, at 473 (stipulating that any program substantially subsi-
dizing tuition would be "problematic").
14 See Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402,413-14 (1985) (citing three grounds for finding ex-
cessive entanglement).
15 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 234 (1997) ("Since we have abandoned the as-
sumption that properly instructed public employees will fail to discharge their duties faithfully,
we must also discard the assumption that pervasive monitoring of [those] teachers is required.").
116 See Agostini, 521 U.S. 233-34; Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 413-14 (calling for cooperation be-
tween administrative personnel in private and parochial school systems).
'
1 7 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232.
Id.
11 Id. at 233.
120 See TRIBE, supra note 69, § 14-10, at 1223 ("The [E]stablishment [CIlause probably
would not stand as an obstacle to a purely neutral program, at least one with a broad enough
class of beneficiary schools and one that channeled aid through parents and children rather than
directly to schools."); Choper, supra note 113, at 13 (noting how the "separationists" on the
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IX. VOUCHER PLANS UNDER FIRE: DOES AGOSTINI COME TO THE
REscuE?
The upheaval that the Agostini decision created in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence has ramifications in many areas of educational
finance on both the national and local levels. While voucher pro-
grams have been proposed and/or implemented in various forms
throughout this decade,12 1 legal challenges to such programs have
been less prevalent until recently. Two of the most heavily litigated
voucher programs are the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program
("MPCP")122 and the Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program, also known as
the Cleveland Voucher Program. 123 Both of these programs were
challenged on Establishment Clause grounds prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Agostini for their inclusion of religious schools.1
24
These decisions, along with a Vermont court's enjoining of a tuition
reimbursement to sectarian school students, will be examined in light
of Agostini.
A. The Milwaukee Parental Choice Program-The First Challenge
The litigation involving the MPCP is the most recent and, thus far,
the only example of a direct application of Agostini to the use of state
voucher monies at parochial schools. The decision of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court upholding the MPCP provides an extensive discussion
of how the modifications made by the Agostini Court, discussed in the
previous section, have opened the door for voucher programs to pass
Establishment Clause muster.
The MPCP was the first voucher program of its kind nationwide'
25
Court found no violation of the Establishment Clause in key holdings). But see Loeb & Kami-
ner, supra note 51, at 10 ("Given the decisions in Zobrest and its predecessors, it appears un-
likely that the Supreme Court would conclude that a voucher plan that includes religious schools
is constitutional."); Public Funding, supra note 67, at 285 ("If Agostini signifies any trend, it is
a smooth descent down the slippery slope of establishment.").
121 See Loeb & Kaminer, supra note 51, at 3 (citing a news report stating that since 1992, 23
states have considered voucher program legislation, with at least eight states doing so in 1996
alone); see also Kennedy, supra note 29, at 428 (discussing California's Proposition 174);
David A. Vise, House Votes Vouchersfor D.C. Students, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 1997, at Al.
12 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 119.23 (West 1991 & Supp. 1998).
'23 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-3313.979 (Banks-Baldwin 1994).
124 Prior to Agostini, the MPCP was challenged under the Wisconsin Constitution only, with
a court determining that no constitutional questions were raised. See Jackson v. Benson, 570
N.W.2d 407 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). This decision was reversed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court
on federal constitutional grounds, relying on Agostini. See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602,
cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998). The Cleveland program was struck down one month prior
to the issuance of the Agostini decision. See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, Nos. 96APE08-982,
96APE08-991, 1997 WL 217583 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997), appeal docketed, 80 Ohio St. 3d
1413 (1997). As the decision has been appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, that court will need
to address the Agostini modifications in its own disposition.
12s See Loeb & Kaminer, supra note 51, at 10 & n.59. The MPCP provided up to $2500
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and was originally limited to nonsectarian private schools. 26 In 1995,
the MPCP was amended to provide aid equal to the amount of state
aid per student to eligible low-income students in the Milwaukee
Public School ("MPS") system.127 The student could then use this
voucher toward tuition at any participating public or private school.
128
State funding to the MPS was then reduced by the amount of vouch-
ers used at private schools, 129 creating exactly the competitive incen-
tive Professor Friedman envisioned. In its first year of implementa-
tion, the MPCP was challenged under the Free Exercise Clause for its
exclusion of religious schools.130  In response, the program was
amended in 1995 to allow sectarian schools to participate while also
providing for a religious activity "opt-out" clause, which allowed par-
ents to request in writing that students be exempted from any relig-
ious activities.' 3' Under the amended program, eighty-four percent of
the nonpublic schools participating were sectarian in nature.1
3 2
In response to these amendments, the program was challenged
again in 1995 by taxpayers and the Milwaukee teachers' union as
violating Wisconsin's Establishment Clause and other provisions of
that state's constitution. 133 The trial court terminated the amended
program on Establishment Clause grounds. 34 On appeal, the Wis-
consin Court of Appeals explicitly stated that the federal Establish-
ment Clause "allows 'more flexibility of interpretation '" 135 than does
the Wisconsin Constitution, and thus limited its analysis to its own
constitutional precedent and relegated all discussion of Agostini to a
parenthetical paragraph. 136 It then affirmed termination of the pro-
gram. 137
In what has been termed by some as "the most significant legal
decision yet" on educational vouchers, 38 the Wisconsin Supreme
Court reversed this decision on federal Establishment Clause grounds
each for income disadvantaged students. See Jackson, 570 N.W.2d at 411.
'26 See Jackson, 570 N.W.2d at 411.
'" See Vis. STAT. ANN. § 119.23(4) (West 1991 & Supp. 1998).
128 See id
'29 See id § 119.23(5)(a).
1 See Miller v. Benson, 878 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. Wis. 1995), vacated, 68 F.3d 163 (7th
Cir. 1995).
'31 See WVIS. TAT. ANN. § 119.23(4)(C).
132 See Loeb & Kaminer, supra note 51, at 14 n.90.
131 See Jackson, 570 N.W.2d at 416-17.
'3 See id at 417.
"' Id. at 416-17 (quoting State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 115 N.W.2d 761, 770 (Wis.
1962)).
136 See id. at420-21.
'37 See id. at 427.
138 Ethan Bronner, Wisconsin Says State Money Can Be Used for Religious Schools, N.Y.
TIMES, June 11, 1998, at Al.
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and reinstated the program. 139 The Wisconsin court relied heavily on
Agostini in its analysis, noting that the Agostini Court had modified
the "effects" prong of the Lemon test to emphasize neutrality and pri-
vate choice over end results. 140 The court stated that, under Agostini,
educational assistance programs could pass the "effects" prong as
long as aid is disbursed according to neutral, secular criteria, and pri-
vate choice determines the ultimate distribution of state funds.'
14
Applying these principles to the MPCP, the court was quick to
note that the transfer of state money to a religious institution did not
result in a per se violation of the Establishment Clause. 42 Rather, in
its neutrality assessment, the court focused on how the beneficiaries
were defined. 143 It distinguished the MPCP from the tuition credit
program in Nyquist, noting that student eligibility under the MPCP
was based on financial means and not religious affiliation.144 Partici-
pating schools were selected on a religiously neutral basis and those
schools could only select MPCP students on a random basis. 45 These
factors were deemed sufficient to satisfy the neutrality requirement of
Agostini.
146
Also, the Wisconsin Supreme Court relied on Mueller and Witters
to avoid an empirical battle over the constitutionality of the program.
The court was not persuaded by the fact that over seventy percent of
the participating private schools were sectarian, quoting the Supreme
Court's reluctance to "'adopt a rule grounding the constitutionality of
a facially neutral law on annual reports .... .""47 This, too, is in line
with the Agostini Court's refusal to engage in a statistical dispute.
Furthermore, the court found the program to be driven by private
choice, even though voucher checks were sent directly to private
schools to then be endorsed by the parents of participating school
children. 148  The court rejected the argument that vouchers were
merely a "sham" to funnel public dollars into religious schools. 4 9
The court stated: "[T]he importance of our inquiry here is not to as-
139 See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 632 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466
(1998). The Wisconsin Supreme Court, under a separate analysis, also upheld the program
against a state constitutional challenge. See id. at 623.
140 See id. at 613; see also supra Part 103) (outlining changes Agostini made to the Lemon
test).
141 See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 617.
142 See id. at 612-13 (citing Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S.
481,486 (1986)).
143 See id. at 613 n.6.
144 See idL at 614 n.9.
145 See id at 617.
146 See id at 618.
147 Id. at 619 n.17 (quoting Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388,401 (1983)).




certain the path upon which public funds travel. . ., but rather to de-
termine who ultimately chooses that path."150 Thus, the court con-
cluded that the MPCP did not direct aid exclusively to benefit paro-
chial school students' families, but merely added religious schools to
the choices that students already had.
15 1
B. The Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program-Simmons-Harris v. Goff
In 1995, a federal court ordered the State of Ohio to take over the
Cleveland City School District due to its educational and financial
crisis.152 In response, the state legislature enacted the Ohio Pilot
Scholarship Program,1 5 3 which provided a scholarship program with
tutorial assistance to students in the Cleveland City School District.154
Students from low-income families were eligible to receive a voucher
worth up to $2500 to apply toward tuition at any alternative school
that had chosen to participate.155 The vouchers were made payable to
parents, but were sent to the designated school, except for public
schools, in which case, the voucher was made out directly to the
school.15 6 Any private school within the district as well as adjacent
public school districts could choose to participate; however, in the
first year of its implementation, approximately 2,000 students used
vouchers to attend fifty-three private schools, 57 eighty percent of
which were sectarian schools.158 Adjacent public school districts did
not elect to participate.159
A group of taxpayers and the Ohio Federation of Teachers filed
suit in January 1996, claiming that the program violated the federal
Establishment Clause as well as several provisions of the Ohio Con-
stitution.160 The trial court granted summary judgment for the state,
150Id.
' See id. at 614 n.9, 619 (concluding that the MPCP "places on equal footing options of
public and private school choice"); cf. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. 756, 783 (1973) (discussing a similar plan whereby private-school families were
eligible for a tuition tax credit).
152 See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, Nos. 96APE08-982, 96APE08-991, 1997 WL 217583, at
*1 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997), appeal docketed, 80 Ohio St. 3d 1413 (1997) (citation omit-
ted).
,
53 Omo REV. CODE. ANN. § 3313.975(A) (Banks-Baldwin 1994).
' See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *1 (noting a need for new programs address-
ing the educational deficiencies of the Cleveland City School District).
'
55See DAN MURPHY Er AL, THE CLEVELAND VOUCHER PROGRAM: WHO CHOOSES? WHO
GETS CHOSEN? WHO PAYS? 1 (Am. Fed'n of Teachers ed., 1997) [hereinafter AFT REPORT].
'-5 See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *1 (discussing the payment structure of the
Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program).
1
57 See id. at *2; AFT REPORT, supra note 155, at 1.158 See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *2.
159 See id.
160 See Gatton v. Goff, Nos. 96CVH-01-193, 96CVH-01-721, 1996 WL 466499, at *4
(Ohio. Ct. C.P. July 31, 1996).
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upholding that program.161 However, the court of appeals, in Sim-
mons-Harris v. Goff,162 reversed this judgment, holding that the
scholarship aspect of the program violated both state and federal con-
stitutional provisions. 163
The court of appeals relied heavily upon the precedents in Nyquist
and Ball and several facts specific to the Cleveland City School Dis-
trict in striking down the voucher program. In analyzing the "effects"
prong of Lemon, the Simmons-Harris court addressed the neutrality of
the program and whether the benefits it provided were "direct and
substantial" or "indirect and incidental," as described in Ball.164 In its
neutrality analysis, the court recognized that the program was facially
neutral, as both public and private schools could choose to partici-
pate.1 65 However, the court ignored the Mueller admonition against
using statistics of disproportionate participation to determine consti-
tutionality. 166 Instead, it held that the voucher program did not make
benefits available to a broad class of parents, but rather provided dif-
ferent benefits depending on whether a private or public school was
chosen.167 The court stated that the Mueller analogy would only be
applicable if adjacent public schools had chosen to participate, but
nonetheless, most parents in the program had chosen sectarian
schools. 168 Thus, the Simmons-Harris court held that the benefits, as
awarded, were not neutral.
69
In addition, the court relied heavily on empirical data in its analy-
sis of the "direct and substantial benefit" portion of the "effects"
prong of Lemon. Dismissing the holdings of Mueller, Witters, and
Zobrest in a single paragraph, 170 the Simmons-Harris court held that
the benefits at issue were not the "result of genuinely independent and
private choices of aid recipients," 171 as was the case in those deci-
161 See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583 at *2 (outlining the case's procedural history).
162 NOS. 96APE08-982, 96APE08-991, 1997 WL 217583 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997), ap-
peal docketed, 80 Ohio St. 3d 1413 (1997).
'63 See id at *16. This decision is currently on appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court. See id.
'64 See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *4 n.2 (citing School Dist. of Grand Rapids v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 394 (1985) (citations omitted).
16 See id. at *7; cf Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488
(1986) (upholding a vocational scholarship program on the grounds that it was made available
without regard to the religious nature of the schools benefited and, therefore, was neutral).
'6 See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *8 (distinguishing the Ohio program from the
program discussed in Mueller).
167 See id. at *9.
'68 See id. at *9 n.3.
'69 See id. at *10 (finding that because parents could only choose between a sectarian school
or the "troubled Cleveland City School District," such choice resulted in a direct government
subsidy).
170 See id.




sions. Rather, the only choice here was to remain in the "troubled"
Cleveland school district or go to a sectarian school. 172 This created
an incentive to attend sectarian schools, a direct violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause. 173
In light of Agostini, there is both a correction and a modification
that the Ohio Supreme Court should make to this analysis on review.
The error arises from the appellate court's reliance upon the specifics
of the Cleveland program, in only its first year of operation, rather
than the program as a whole, in assessing its neutrality. While the
program is neutral on its face, the Simmons-Harris court held that the
lack of participation by adjacent public school districts "skew[s it]
toward religion.' 174 Following this reasoning, it would seem the con-
stitutionality of the Pilot Program could change from year to year de-
pending on which schools choose to participate. If an adjacent dis-
trict were to choose to participate one year, the program would pass
under the Mueller analogy, but should that school later withdraw, the
program could again be unconstitutional. 175 In Mueller, and its prog-
eny up to Agostini, the Supreme Court avoided this problem by re-
fusing to recognize the actual number of religious schools that bene-
fited from various programs, instead noting that such benefits were
the result of private choices and not the program itself.176 In Mueller,
for all practical purposes, the tax deduction could only be taken by
parents of parochial school students. The fact that almost ninety-five
percent of the actual deductions were for parochial school expenses
was irrelevant. 177 Similarly, neither the Witters nor the Zobrest Court
chose to address the possibility that any number of disabled students
could use the respective grants for parochial education. 17  Given
these precedents, whether a program overwhelmingly benefits relig-
172 See id. at *10 (noting that this choice could "hardly be characterized as 'genuine and in-
dependent') (citation omitted). However, under the Cleveland program, a parent must first
make the choice to enter the program before a choice can be made regarding which school to
attend. See Nero, supra note 95, at 1126-27 (noting that a majority of families chose to not even
apply for vouchers under the program).
'
73 See Simmons-Harris, 1997 WL 217583, at *9.
174 Id at *7 (citing Witters, 474 U.S. at 488).
.
75 See Adams, supra note 43, at 196.
176 See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983) ("We would be loath to adopt a rule
grounding the constitutionality of a facially neutral law on annual reports reciting the extent to
which various classes of private citizens claimed benefits under the law."); see also Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 229 (1997) (noting that the Court would not consider the number of sec-
tarian students benefited by a program when determining the constitutionality of that program);
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 9 (1993) (holding that the number of those
electing to participate in a particular program is not a dispositive factor in an Establishment
Clause analysis).
177 See Mueller, 463 U.S at 401; Higginbotham, supra note 20.
178 But see Witters, 474 U.S. at 488 (noting that the amount of aid flowing to religious edu-
cation was "incidental").
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ious education as in Mueller instead of an isolated benefit to an indi-
vidual, as in Witters and Zobrest, is irrelevant as long as the overall
program is neutral in dispensing such benefits. As the Simmons-
Harris court conceded, the Cleveland program is neutral on its face,
in that it defines recipients with respect to income status, not religious
affiliation, and thus no further investigation into its potentially dispa-
rate impact is necessary to comply with current federal Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.1 79
Once this correction has been made, the door is opened to modifi-
cation in light of Agostini. The Simmons-Harris court stated that aid
to the sectarian schools could only be considered "indirect" under the
"effects" prong of Lemon, if it was the result of independent choices
of private individuals. 80 While the court erred in using specifics to
conclude that no "real" choice existed, its assumption that such aid
was substantial enough to result in a "direct governmental subsidy" is
also misplaced.1
81
One of the most striking aspects of the Agostini holding was its
rejection of the fifty-year-old presumption that "all public aid that
directly aids the educational function of religious schools impermissi-
bly finances religious indoctrination ....,,18 While the Simmons-
Harris court did not specifically cite this long-standing rule, the court
nonetheless seemed to rely on it, assuming that since a significant
portion of the voucher funds would be used at parochial schools, that
aid operated as a direct subsidy. There was no discussion of how
much of the voucher covers general secular education 83 or how the
amount compares to the public school costs per pupil to determine
whether sectarian education was truly being subsidized. Even so, Ag-
ostini dispenses with the need for such empirical analysis. The Title I
funds at issue in Agostini were available to income disadvantaged
students in both public and private schools, 184 much like the vouchers
179 It should also be noted that under traditional constitutional jurisprudence, if a seemingly
unconstitutional provision can be remedied by a "narrowing construction" that will make it
constitutional, it will be upheld. See Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383,
397 (1988). Thus, it would appear here, that as the statutory program provides for a potentially
constitutional outcome-i.e., where both public and private schools participate-the fact that
this outcome has not yet occurred should not be dispositive to the determination of its constitu-
tionality.
'go See Simmons-Harris v. Goff, Nos. 96APE08-982, 96APE08-991, 1997 WL 217583, at
*9 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997).
'8 Id. at *10.
182 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222 (1997).
183 In fact, only 90% of a school's tuition can be paid with the state-provided voucher, even
if the school's tuition is less than the $2500 cap. See AFT REPORT, supra note 155, at I. The
remainder must come from non-state sources, which in most cases is provided by parishes or
other non-profit organizations that operate the private schools. See id.184 SeeAgostini, 521 U.S. at 209-10.
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available in the Cleveland program. In Agostini, the Supreme Court
held that the aid could not be presumed to supplant other revenues,
thus making it available for religious education. 185  The Agostini
Court relied instead on the neutrality of the aid's eligibility require-
ments and private individual choice as dispositive of the program's
constitutionality.
186
Similarly in the Cleveland program, it can not be assumed that
voucher monies, regardless of their amount or prevalence, are directly
subsidizing religious activities merely because they are used by paro-
chial schools. Instead, the Ohio Supreme Court should focus on the
eligibility requirements of the program as a whole. Like Witters and
Zobrest, where aid was limited to a specified group of beneficiaries
on religiously neutral grounds, 87 vouchers are awarded on the basis
of income, not the sectarian or secular nature of the chosen school. In
addition, the Ohio Supreme Court should not be concerned with the
amount of state aid that may flow to sectarian schools. In Agostini,
over fifteen million dollars per year was spent in Title I funds on non-
public schools, of which ninety percent were sectarian. 188 By anal-
ogy, the fact that over five million dollars in state aid was spent on
Cleveland vouchers189 should not determine the constitutionality of
that program.
The Simmons-Harris court should also have incorporated the pri-
vate choice analysis of Agostini into its holding.190 Voucher monies
from the Ohio Pilot Scholarship Program that arrive in sectarian
school treasuries are the result of private choices by individuals,
which have been repeatedly upheld as neutral by the Supreme
Court.191 The key is not that the money trail may be traced back to
the state, but rather who exerts power over those funds. 92 After all,
'5 See hL at226.
18 See idL at 232 ("[S]ervices are available to all children who meet the Act's eligibility re-
quirements, no matter what their religious beliefs or where they go to school .... [The program]
does not, therefore, give aid recipients any incentive to modify their religious beliefs or prac-
tices in order to obtain those services.").
187 In Witters, grants were limited to blind persons pursuing vocational studies. See Witters
v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 483 (1986). In Zobrest, educational
assistance was limited to handicapped children. See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509
U.S. 1, 3 (1993).
88 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 210, 213.
189 See AFT REPORT, supra note 155, at 16.
190 See supra Part I(B)(2) (describing the Agostini Court's focus on private choice in Estab-
lishment Clause analysis).
191 See, e.g., Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 10; Witters, 474 U.S. at 488-89; Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388, 399 (1983).
192 See Jackson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 618 (Wis. 1998) (holding that it is not "the path upon
which funds travel ... but rather ... who ultimately chooses that path" that is dispositive of a
voucher program's constitutionality); Adams, supra note 43, at 201 (arguing that it is the
"power over the funds," not the line of transfer, that is relevant to Establishment Clause analy-
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the sectarian school receives no money until a parent directs it
there. 193 Thus, much like the "paycheck analogy,"'194 the decision to
use that money for a religious purpose can no longer be attributable to
the state as a "direct subsidy." The fact that parents could choose
from both private religious schools and private nonsectarian schools
further reinforces the independence of that choice. Furthermore,
funds directed by such a choice can not be presumed to be fungible
for support of religious indoctrination under Agostini.195 This further
erodes the Simmons-Harris court's reasoning in finding the Cleveland
voucher program to be a direct subsidy in violation of the Establish-
ment Clause.
196
C. The Vermont Tuition Reimbursement Scheme-Chittenden
Town School District v. Vermont Department of Education
Just days after Agostini was decided, a Vermont superior court, in
Chittenden Town School District v. Vermont Department of Educa-
tion,1 97 was one of the first state courts to attempt to interpret and ap-
ply its holding. Vermont law provides that if a school district does
not maintain a public high school, then the district may pay tuition for
its students to attend another high school, as long as that the school is
approved by the state's board of education. 98  In May 1996, the
Chittenden Town School Board, which did not maintain a high
school, voted to pay the tuition of fifteen students to attend a nearby
Catholic high school. 199 In response, the state Department of Educa-
tion terminated funding to the Chittenden district.200 The district,
joined by the parents of the Catholic school students, filed suit,
claiming that their free exercise rights were violated by the state's
termination of funding.201 The court held that the state's defense that
the tuition payments would violate the Establishment Clause negated
sis).
193 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.979 (West Supp. 1997) ("Each scholarship or grant to
be used for payments to a registered private school.., is payable to the parents of the student
entitled to [the aid].").
194 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
19- See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 228 (1997) (finding that funding can not be pre-
sumed to "'reliev[e] sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in educating
their students') (quoting Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 12).
196 But see Public Funding, supra note 67, at 286 (concluding that by forsaking the pre-
sumption of direct aid being per se invalid, the Court has "in effect constitutionalized direct aid
to religious enterprises" as there are no means of separating the secular and sectarian functions
of a parochial school).
197 No. S0478-96 (Vt. Super. Ct. June 27, 1997).
198 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 822 (1989 & Supp. 1998).
'99 See Chittenden, No. S0478-96, at 2. This high school was approved as an independent
school by the state Department of Education. See id. at 3.
200 See id at3.
20' See id at 5.
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the free exercise claim, and it accordingly enjoined the district from
further payments. 2°2
In a very thorough analysis, the Vermont court first found that the
religious protections granted by the Vermont Constitution were co-
extensive with those of the federal Constitution, thus requiring the
court to use federal precedent in its analysis. 20 3 In outlining the evo-
lution of federal Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the Vermont
court noted that the Supreme Court has established that it can not be
assumed that "all teaching in a sectarian school is religious or that the
processes of secular and religious training are [impermissibly] inter-
twined.' ' " 4 A program that directly benefits the educational function
of a religious school is not per se unconstitutional; rather, it must first
be determined whether the funding is used "to finance or encourage
religious indoctrination of the benefited students." 20 5 The Chittenden
court focused on Agostini's rejection of the presumption of a sym-
bolic union between church and state whenever public school teachers
step into religious premises as well as the impermissible inculcation
of religion by those teachers.20 6 The court also held that the key to
determining the aid's effect lies in the specific destination of that aid,
not merely the fact that the aid happens to "fill the coffers" of paro-
chial schools or the potential for fungibility.207
In applying these principles to the tuition reimbursement by the
Chittenden school board, the Vermont court focused on two factual
differences and one theoretical difference between that program and
the Title I funds upheld in Agostini. First, the court noted that while
the Agostini program was "carefully constrained," 208 the Chittenden
payments went directly into the Catholic school's treasury for unre-
stricted use, thus exceeding the scope of Agostini.209 Second, the
court was concerned with these payments supplanting general educa-
tional costs of the Catholic school, rather than merely providing sup-
plemental remedial services, as in Agostini.210 Finally, it was held
that because of the unrestricted nature of the payments, they could be
used to pay parochial school teachers who presumably would incor-
f' See id. at 5-6, 47.
20 See id. at 13.
204 Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., No. S0478-96, at 19 (Vt. Super.
Ct. June 27, 1997) (quoting Mueller v. Alien, 392 U.S. 236,248 (1983).
'0
5 Id. at 21 (citing Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 230 (1997)).
206 See id. at 22-23.
201 See i1d at23.
2 Id. at 24.
"9 See Udt at 24. But see Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 618 (Wis. 1998) (allowing
direct payments to parochial school's treasury).210 See Chittenden, No. S0478-96, at 24.
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porate religion into their classes.211  The court concluded that this
situation went well beyond a "symbolic union," creating a direct link
in which parents and students would be unable to distinguish between
212
state-funded secular activities and privately-funded religious ones.
For these reasons, the court found that these payments directly aided
religious indoctrination and, therefore, violated the Establishment
Clause.213
Also important was the court's rejection of the argument that pri-
vate choice would not modify the nature of the aid from "direct and
substantial" to "indirect and incidental." The court distinguished the
Chittenden plan from the programs in Mueller, Witters and Zobrest on
the grounds that the payment to the school occurred after the student
made an independent choice to attend.214 The court also indicated
that the Chittenden program provided a "method by which sectarian
schools could obtain consistent and substantial financial assistance
from the state., 21 5 Thus, the court appeared to return to the Nyquist
analysis in holding that parental choice was but one factor to consider
in assessing the constitutionality of such programs and that choice
alone may be unable to overcome the substantial nature of the benefit
received.216
Absent from the Chittenden opinion was any reference to the neu-
trality of the Vermont tuition reimbursement statute or its potential
class of beneficiaries, the primary foci of Justice O'Connor's Agostini
opinion.217 The Vermont statute provided that if a district chooses not
to operate a high school, and pay the tuition of its students, then such
a payment "shall be paid to an approved public or independent high
school, to be selected by the parents or guardians of the pupil .... ,,218
There is no reference to the religious nature of the school attended in
authorizing these payments. As stated in Agostini, there is no relig-
ious incentive where "aid is allocated on the basis of neutral, secular
criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is made available
to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a nondiscriminatory ba-
21 See id. at 25.
212 See id.
213 See id. at 30.
214 See id. at 32-33.
215 Id. at 33. The Vermont Supreme Court addressed this very statute in a challenge to a
tuition reimbursement for an out-of-state sectarian school. See Campbell v. Manchester Bd. of
Sch. Dirs., 641 A.2d 352 (Vt. 1994) (upholding reimbursement program on grounds that it pro-
vided only an attenuated benefit to religious schools). The Chittenden court, noting that court's
break from state precedent, questioned the reasoning of the Campbell holding and restricted it to
its facts. See Chittenden, No. S0478-96, at 45-46.
216 See Chittenden, No. S0478-96, at 34 (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Lib-
erty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 781 (1973)).217 See supra discussion at Part I(B)(1).
218 VT. STAT. ANN. tit.16, § 822(a)(1) (1989 & Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
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sis."219 The criteria for aid disbursement under this statute is a dis-
trict's decision not to operate a high school followed by the private
parental choice of which school the student will attend. Neither of
these conditions is religion-based and could be fulfilled by both re-
ligious and secular beneficiaries. 220 Thus, in failing to address the
neutrality of the statute in dispensing aid, the Chittenden court missed
an important modification in Establishment Clause analysis, which
may corrode the basis of its holding.
Another potential flaw in Chittenden analysis, when combined
with its failure to address the neutrality of the aid program, further
weakens the validity of its disposition. As previously described, the
Vermont court was not convinced that parental choice was sufficient
to change the nature of the aid from direct to indirect.221 However,
parental choice was at the heart of the Agostini reversal, and has been
the main avenue of inquiry in many recent cases. 22 Choice recon-
ciles any establishment problems between a neutral aid program and
its effects, by "cleansing [that aid] of government taint. ' 223 Parents
are not "mere conduit[s]" as suspected in Nyquist,224 but instead make
proactive choices that determine the end result of a neutral program.
The Vermont statute sought to insure compliance with state manda-
tory education laws and was thus a neutral program on its face. The
fact that an independent, private choice may direct some funds to a
religious school does not destroy that neutrality. Thus, while the
Chittenden court did not find private choice to be integral to its analy-
sis, had it properly followed the Agostini query and first assessed the
statute's facial neutrality, the existence of choice should have been
sufficient to overcome the "permissible effects" issue, and the statute
would have withstood Establishment Clause scrutiny.
2 19Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. at 231.
m For example, it would also be within the authorization of the statute for the district to
pay a student's tuition to attend a nearby public, secular school.
221 See Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., No. S0478-96, at 33 (Vt.
Super. Ct. June 27, 1997).
222 See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1986);
see also Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 848 (O'Connor I concurring);
Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 618. This new emphasis on individual choice is further reinforced by
reference to the Witters "paycheck analogy" in the Agostini decision. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at
226 (citing Witters, 474 U.S. at 486-87).
223 Adams, supra note 43, at 191; see also supra notes 100-13 and accompanying text (de-
scribing how private choice among religious and secular recipients is not direct aid in violation
of the Establishment Clause).
27A Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 786 (1973).
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D. Limitations in Applying Agostini
Despite the Supreme Court's apparent transition from a separa-
tionist to a neutrality stance that is seemingly more open to public
funding of religious education, several problems arise when the Ag-
ostini holding is applied directly to voucher programs such as those
currently being litigated in Ohio and Wisconsin. The most glaring
problem is that vouchers allow public funds to be deposited, although
indirectly through private choice,2 5 into the treasuries of religious
schools. Both the Agostini and Zobrest decisions noted that "[n]o
[public] funds ever reach the coffers of religious schools. ' 26 In fact,
all of the decisions discussed above, in which funding had been up-
held, were limited to specific curriculum programs. For example,
Agostini involved a federal after-school remedial program.227 Zobrest
and Witters both involved public aid limited to the disabled.2 8 Even
Mueller, the source of the neutrality analysis, dealt with individual tax
deductions and not cash disbursements to schools.229 Voucher pro-
grams, specifically those in Milwaukee and Cleveland, limit eligibil-
ity to low-income students, but nonetheless provide funds that, once
turned over to parochial schools, become part of the unrestricted op-
erating fund. While the Wisconsin Supreme Court is the only court to
date which has reconciled this issue in light of Agostini,230 it is un-
known whether this analysis will become the norm.
The concern with allotting unrestricted funds to religious schools
is the potential for those monies to supplant the general operating
funds earmarked for secular education, thus freeing more funds for
religious education.231 In spite of this concern, the Agostini Court
refused to speculate whether such fungibility could result from the
225 See supra Part I(B)(2) (discussing the issue of private choice under AgostinO.
226 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228; see also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1,
12 (1993) (distinguishing aid from a direct cash subsidy to the school).
27 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209.
228 See Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 3 (applying for the services of a deaf interpreter under the fed-
eral Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 483 (1986) (applying for rehabilitation services from the Washington
Commission for the Blind).
229 See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 391 (involving a Minnesota tax deduction for edu-
cational expenses).
230 See supra Part 1(A) (discussing the Jackson II opinion).
231 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 252 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that earlier cases such as
Ball did not condemn all aid to religious schools, only that aid that was "direct and substantial");
see also supra Part I(B)(2) (discussing fungibility issues).
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Title I program.232 The Court referred to its refusal to address statis-
tics in Zobrest, noting that its decision there did not hinge on the fact
that the Plaintiff was the only child using a publicly funded interpreter
at a parochial school.233  Thus, while opponents to vouchers often
distinguish them from previous decisions on the grounds that they are
fungible and unrestricted funds,234 the Supreme Court has repeatedly
refused to use participation statistics or expenditure figures to deter-
mine the constitutionality of an otherwise neutral program.235 Even as
early as Ball, the Court "ha[d] never accepted the mere possibility of
subsidization . . . as sufficient to invalidate an aid program.
''236
Whether this refusal is based on the discrete nature of the programs
that come before the Court or an evolving approach to constitutional
interpretation will not likely be determined until such a program is
addressed by the Court.
Further complicating this determination is the Agostini Court's
failure to state clearly whether all of its holdings in Aguilar and Ball
were overruled. The decision is clear that the "Shared Time" and Ti-
tle I programs at issue, which enabled public school teachers to pro-
vide remedial instruction on parochial school premises,237 are consti-
tutional in light of subsequent changes in Establishment Clause analy-
sis. 238 What the Court did not mention, however, was its holding in
Ball, striking down a similar program that compensated parochial
school teachers for providing supplemental services in parochial
schools?3 9 The Agostini dissenters, along with some commentators,
propose that such an absence gives the Court room to strike down that
program.24° The majority's language does support that proposition,
stating that it was "overruling [Aguilar] and those portions of [Ball]
232 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226-27. But see Green, supra note 36, at 3 (noting that the
Court's decision should have been limited to the discrete context of the Title I program).
'
3
' See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 228.
2 See Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., No. S0478-96, 24-25 (Vt.
Super. Ct. June 27, 1997) (emphasizing that funds would be transferred into the schools' general
budget); Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407,421 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd, 578 N.W.2d 602
(Wis. 1998) (noting that "over $40 million in state payments could be received by sectarian
schools").
235 See Adams supra note 43, at 187 (stating that Justice O'Connor, for instance, has fo-
cused on "religious-nonreligious" distinctions); see also supra notes 93-96 (discussing the
Mueller Court's rejection of statistics).236 Kennedy, supra note 29, at 430 (quoting School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373,394 (1985)).
237 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 209.
238 See id at 235 ("[W]e must acknowledge that Aguilar, as well as the portion of Ball...
are no longer good law.").
23' Ball, 473 U.S. at 386-87.
mo See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 240 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing the line drawn in Ball as
"very reasonable"); Memorandum from Stephen K. Green, supra note 36, at 4 (noting that part
of purpose behind the Court's decision in Agostini was to leave the Ball holding intact).
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inconsistent with our more recent decisions."241 This holding implies
that while public school employees may administer government edu-
cation programs without violating the Establishment Clause, once
sectarian school employees are involved, the danger of religious in-
doctrination is enhanced, thus violating that clause.242 This could be
fatal to any analysis of a voucher program as those funds, once signed
over to the parochial schools' treasuries, could be used to pay any
teachers, even those of religious subjects. While this may seem
problematic, as several Supreme Court decisions have noted that
public funds could not be used to pay the salaries of parochial school
teachers without violating the Establishment Clause,243 if Agostini
truly indicates a shift toward a neutrality analysis, there is, in fact, no
problem. Neutrality focuses on the criteria used to allocate the aid to
certain classes of beneficiaries and the private choices of those bene-
ficiaries. 244 It is not concerned with how the aid is used once an inde-
pendent choice has been made.245 Nonetheless, in those courts that
have addressed vouchers and other tuition subsidization programs, the
unrestricted nature of the aid has been a distinguishing factor.246
It would appear that the Witters decision would rectify any con-
cerns about unrestricted, potentially fungible grants, as that case in-
volved a tuition grant given to a student to attend a religious semi-
nary. 247 That grant was not limited to secular purposes, but went di-
rectly into the seminary's treasury. 248 The Witters Court nonetheless
held that the neutral availability of the statute, combined with the
element of private choice, rendered that program constitutional. 249
Consistent with that decision, voucher proponents often analogize
these programs to federal and state grants as well as loans for higher
education, all of which have been held constitutional.2 0 Still, a
241 Agostini, 521 U.S. at 236 (emphasis added).
2 4 2 See Memorandum from Stephen K. Green, supra note 36, at 4 (noting that impermissible
government indoctrination of religion is more likely to occur when religious employees perform
secular functions within the environment of a sectarian institution); see also Ball, 473 U.S. at
386-87 (finding a "substantial risk" that parochial school teachers will inculcate religion into
their secular after-school classes, just as they are expected to do during the regular school day).
243 See e.g., Ball, 473 U.S. at 386-87; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,607 & 615 (1971);
see also Memorandum from Stephen K. Green, supra note 36, at 4 (stating that courts still do
not allow parochial teachers to "teach religious subjects" at the government's expense).
244 See supra Part I(B)(1) (discussing the Court's neutrality analysis in AgostinO.
245 See supra Part I(B)(1) (describing the paycheck analogy in Witters); see also Adams,
supra note 43, at 188 (emphasizing that private choice is a "key factor" in neutrality examina-
tion).
246 See supra Part II(B) & (C) (discussing the Simmons-Harris and Chittenden decisions).
But see supra Part II(A) (discussing the Jackson II decision).
247 See Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481,483 (1986).
m See id. at 487.
29 See id. at 488-89.
250 See Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., No. S0478-96, at 25-26 (Vt.
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voucher program that combines neutral criteria with private choice
may still not be enough to pass constitutional muster.
The Supreme Court has drawn a significant distinction between
elementary and post-secondary education in Establishment Clause
analysis.251 There are two reasons behind this distinction: first, ele-
mentary school children are more impressionable than college stu-
dents, and second, the purpose of parochial schools is to indoctrinate
students for future adherence to a religious faith. 52 Elementary stu-
dents' greater susceptibility to religious indoctrination is a combina-
tion of their young age and the relative lack of academic freedom that
they have in relation to college students. 3 Even in light of Agostini,
it is difficult to rebut this presumption. It should nevertheless be
noted that under a true neutrality analysis, the determining factors of
constitutionality are the aid's criteria and the existence of private, in-
dependent choice, not what may or may not happen once that choice
is made72 4 Furthermore, this presumption of greater susceptibility
may run afoul of parents' fundamental right to direct their children's
education, even if exercising that right involves religious indoctrina-
tion.25 Agostini may shed light on the indoctrination presumption.
While there is no indication that parochial schools no longer inculcate
religious beliefs in order to sustain their respective communities of
faith, the assumption that any public support of those schools imper-
missibly encourages that indoctrination may no longer be valid. Ag-
ostini specifically overruled the presumption that the presence of
public employees on parochial school premises resulted in a symbolic
union between church and state in violation of the Establishment
Clause.2 6 Would vouchers promote this kind of symbolic indoctri-
nation any more than public school teachers?257  But Agostini and
Jackson II both noted that any such aid to indoctrination would be
attributable only to private choice and not to the state directly, and
Super. Ct. June 27, 1997) (describing plaintiffs argument that because federal government
loans can be used at religious colleges the same should apply to high schools); see also Dent,
supra note 94, at 736 (contrasting the treatment of federal aid to sectarian colleges with aid to
elementary and secondary schools).
25 See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-87 (1971).
252 See id. at 685-86; see also Higginbotham, supra note 20.
2" See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 686 (noting that college courses, by the nature of their disci-
plines, limit opportunities for religious influence).
2m See supra Part I(B)(1) (discussing the concept of neutrality in church-state cases); see
also Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 602, 619 n.17 (Wis. 1998) ("[T]he percent of program
funds eventually paid to sectarian private schools is irrelevant to our inquiry.").
25 See infra notes 300-13 and accompanying text (describing this right as one of funda-
mental free exercise).
256 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997).
2 Perhaps, according to one court. See Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont Dep't of
Educ., No. S0478-96, at 27 (Vt. Super. Ct. June 27, 1997).
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thus would be permissible under a neutrality analysis.2 It remains to
be seen whether this rationale may be extended to a general grant of
funds to a parochial school via school children's parents.259
III. INSURRECTION UNDER AGOSTINI: STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATIONS
While several academics have hailed the Witters and Zobrest deci-
sions, and more recently the Agostini decision, as opening the door to
vouchers and other public support of sectarian education, 26o judicial
decisions have not yet done so. Two challenges that are commonly
used in litigation concerning voucher programs circumvent the
seemingly accommodating stance taken by the Supreme Court in as-
sessing the constitutionality of public aid to parochial schools. First,
determinations by state courts that establishment clause provisions in
their respective state constitutions are more restrictive than the federal
Establishment Clause, enabling courts to rely on their own precedent
while relegating Supreme Court decisions to mere persuasive author-
ity. Second, claims brought under state constitutional provisions spe-
cifically prohibiting expenditure of public funds on sectarian educa-
tion allow courts to avoid Establishment Clause analysis, state or fed-
eral, altogether. The use of such claims and assertions creates obsta-
cles in Establishment Clause jurisprudence as well as in voucher pro-
grams themselves.
Addressing the interpretation impediment, almost half of the states
2'8 See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 230-31 (citing Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the
Blind, 474 U.S 481,488 (1986)); Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 618 (citing Witters, 474 U.S at 487).
29 It should also be noted that as elementary education is mandatory under state law, this
may create its own Establishment Clause issue. See Chittenden, No. S0478-96, at 26. Specifi-
cally, where a district, seeking to comply with its legal duty to provide elementary education,
funds that education through a religious school, a direct link between church and state is formed.
See id. But see Jackson, 578 N.W.2d at 619 (concluding that disbursing voucher funds directly
to parochial schools did not have the primary effect of advancing religion in violation of the
Lemon test).
260 See TRIBE, supra note 69, § 14-10, at 1223 (noting that the Court would uphold an edu-
cational voucher plan based on parental choice); Choper, supra note 113, at 13 (stating that the
Witters concurrence "clearly describes a situation that includes vouchers"); Futterman, supra
note 8, at 731 ("[A] tuition voucher plan therefore passes Establishment Clause muster under
what remains of the Court's Lemon test."); Stick, supra note 2, at 449 (claiming that voucher
plans could pass in light of Witters's concurring opinions). But see Futterman, supra note 8, at
732 (concluding that vouchers are nonetheless "fundamentally at odds" with Establishment
Clause jurisprudence); Loeb & Kaminer, supra note 51, at 37 (asserting that voucher plans
violate the federal constitution); Stick, supra note 2, at 472-73 (concluding that voucher pro-
grams that fund complete tuition violate the Establishment Clause); Memorandum from Stephen
K Green, supra note 36, at 3 (stating that dicta in Agostini can not be "squared" with vouchers
due to "fungibility" issues).
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have determined that the Supreme Court's decisions are not binding
on their interpretation of their own state constitutions.26' Of these,
twelve state courts have specifically noted that their establishment
clause provisions require more strict separation of church and state
than does the federal Constitution.262 In such situations, state courts
can disregard changes in federal precedent in favor of upholding their
own precedent. One example is the interim decision in Jackson 1,263
in which the MPCP was struck down for violating the Wisconsin Es-
tablishment Clause.264  The Jackson I court attempted to avoid the
federal constitutional issues and Agostini by limiting its analysis to
state Establishment Clause grounds, as these were more restrictive.
265
This approach was subsequently rejected by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court in favor of a more liberal interpretation under Agostini
2 66
Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court refused to follow the
Witters decision while interpreting its own constitution. After the
Witters Court concluded that the use of state vocational aid for relig-
ious education was constitutional, the Washington Supreme Court
ignored this decision on remand, holding that the aid was unconstitu-
tional under a separate provision of the Washington Constitution.267
Specifically, the court held: "When a person is 'getting a religious
education' ... [he or she] comes squarely within the express prohibi-
tion.., that 'no public money.., shall be appropriated for or applied
to any religious ... instruction.',' 2 68
There is nothing unconstitutional in state courts disregarding fed-
eral precedent in interpreting their own constitutions. In fact, the idea
of federalism, so firmly entrenched in the U.S. Constitution, encour-
ages such independence. The Supreme Court did not find any of the
public aid programs that passed the Lemon test to be required under
the First Amendment, and very few of them were federally funded.269
261 See Viteritti, supra note 6, at 149 (arguing that tuition assistance programs are, in gen-
eral, constitutional).
See id. at 149 n.195.
m 570 N.W.2d 407 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) (contending that finding a feasible test for evalu-
ating the constitutionality of school voucher programs is a difficult task).
See Jackson, 570 N.W.2d at 427. No federal constitutional claims were raised in that
case, possibly to avoid review at the federal level. See Viteritti, supra note 6, at 158 (proposing
that separationists' new legal strategy of initiating litigation at the state rather than federal level
indicates that the federal judiciary is more sympathetic toward school choice).
0 See Jackson, 570 N.W.2d at 416-17 (holding that the parochial voucher program at issue
is constitutional).
26See supra Part 1(A) (discussing the Jackson II decision).
u See Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 771 P.2d 1119, 1123 (Wash. 1989) (holding
that the state court did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution by invali-
dating a law in violation of its own state constitution).
263 Kemerer, supra note 52, at 26 (citing Witters, 771 P.2d at 1119-20).
269 Of the cases cited thus far, only the Title I funds in Agostini, see supra notes 70-82 and
accompanying text, and the IDEA assistance in Zobrest were federally funded programs. See
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States may refuse to offer financial or other benefits under their own
interpretation of state constitutions as long as such denial is not re-
ligiously discriminatory.2 70 This is where two-tiered interpretation, at
the federal and state levels, can become problematic. A state may
define its rights more broadly than similar federal rights, but it may
not abridge federal rights as they are defined by the Supreme Court.271
However, in complying with the more stringent restrictions of their
own anti-establishment provisions, states must be careful not to un-
necessarily infringe upon individuals' free exercise rights.27a It may
be that by rejecting decisions by the Supreme Court, which uphold
certain programs as constitutional,273 state courts are actually "tread-
ing on the free exercise rights of individuals. 274 While little attention
has been paid by the Supreme Court or state courts to the free exer-
cise claims made by proponents of public aid to sectarian schools
275
should those claims succeed, state courts will be less free to interpret
their own religion clauses so strictly.
State courts will also be limited in modifying Establishment
Clause analysis should a federally funded voucher system ever be
implemented. Although the Witters Court had no problem applying
its own analysis to a vocational aid program that was eighty percent
federally funded,276 any program that was exclusively funded by the
federal government would preempt state law under the Supremacy
Clause.277 Thus a federal program, which was deemed by the Su-
preme Court to fall within the realm of free exercise rights, could not
be impeded by a state constitution's prohibition of religious sup-
port.278 In light of recent federal decisions, any state court that has
not yet addressed its own religion clause provisions could be forced to
reassess its own treatment of such cases.
supra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
270 See Viteritti, supra note 6, at 138 (discussing how the Renquist Court is unwilling to use
the Establishment Clause to deny general public entitlements on religious grounds).
271 See id. at 160; see also Simmons-Harris v. Goff, Nos. 96APE08-982, 96APE08-991,
1997 WL 217583, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997) ("[The United States Constitution...
provides a floor below which state court decisions may not fall.").
272 See Futterman, supra note 8, at 712 & n.8 ("[Tihe religion clauses are like two river-
banks, forming a parallel set of barriers through which government action must flow.").
273 See, e.g., Witters, 771 P.2d at 1122 (deeming a program unconstitutional under the
Washington Constitution after it had been upheld under the federal Constitution by the U.S.
Supreme Court).
274 Viteritti, supra note 6, at 160.
275 See infra Part IV (outlining the availability of free exercise claims for religious school
attendees).
276 See Kemerer, supra note 52, at 33.
277 See iL; cf. Garnett v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 987 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1993) (ruling
that the federal Equal Access Act preempts Washington's constitutional prohibition against
religious groups meeting on public school property).
278 See Kemerer, supra note 52, at 33.
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IV. FREE EXERCISE: A NEW DIRECTION FOR VOUCHER PROPONENTS
The evolution of jurisprudence relating to public aid to parochial
schools has significantly focused on analysis of the prohibitive half of
the First Amendment, the Establishment Clause, which states: "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion."
279
This provision seeks to keep religion removed from the "business of
government., 28 0 But an increasing number of scholars, and some liti-
gants, have bdgun to counter the Establishment Clause by focusing on
the enumerating half of the Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause:
"Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the free exercise [of re-
ligion]. ' 28 1 This provision seeks to keep government out of the con-
duct of religion. 2 Courts and legislatures must strike a fine balance
between the competing purposes of these clauses, as each is easily
overwhelmed by the other.283 Educational funding issues provide a
simple example of the conflict. Opponents of aid to private schools
craft arguments under the Establishment Clause, claiming that subsi-
dizing religious education is a means of promoting and establishing
government-sponsored religions. Aid proponents, on the other hand,
argue, based on the Free Exercise Clause, that sending their children
to religious schools constitutes the free exercise of religion and
should not be inhibited by the government's refusal to provide finan-
cial aid.284 While this conflict appears to present a significant judicial
quandary, in reality it has not. Courts, especially the Supreme Court,
have provided little guidance on how to reconcile these competing
clauses. This section attempts to explain why free exercise claims
have been virtually ignored in much of the precedent concerning
vouchers, while addressing the possibility of better utilizing such
claims in the future.
Over seventy years ago, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,285 the Su-
preme Court established that an individual can not be required to
submit to a publicly-funded secular education in light of the Free Ex-
ercise Clause.286 This holding was expanded into a more general pa-
rental right to direct the education of their children, including the
m U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
2w See Futterman, supra note 8, at 712 (discussing the dual purpose of the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause).
28'U.S. CONST. amend I.
28 See Futterman, supra note 8, at 712.
283 See id. at 711, 739-40 (likening the conflict between the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause to a river flowing along two riverbanks both of which are subject to ero-
sion and must be watched carefully).
284 See Viteritti, supra note 6, at 182 (stating that the denial of funding could ultimately lead
to one group imposing its views upon the minority).
m 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
286 See id. at 535-36.
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right to send them to religious or other private schools.287 In Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 8 8 the Supreme Court set the standard for assessing free
exercise claims. In that case, several Amish parents were fined for
removing their children from a public secondary school in violation
of Wisconsin's compulsory education law.289 The Yoder Court found
that the Amish way of life rejects worldly influence and thus for the
state to force parents to subject their children to such influence con-
stitutes a violation of their free exercise rights.290 Although the state
did have an interest in providing educational opportunities for Amish
children, the Court held that such interest was insufficiently compel-
ling to justify the imposition on the parents' free exercise rights.29t
The Court has, in other cases, extended this compelling interest stan-
dard to free exercise claims in the employment area as well.292  In
several cases, individuals were terminated or refused to accept posi-
tions because of their refusal to work on the Sabbath for religious rea-
sons and the state refused to grant them unemployment benefits as a
result.293 The Supreme Court has held that, without a compelling in-
terest, the state could not force an individual to choose between fol-
lowing one's religion and forfeiting government benefits.294
A more recent decision, however, sets limits on the use of this
compelling interest test. In Employment Division v. Smith,295 the
Court affimned the drug convictions of several American Indians for
the use of peyote, even though such use had been in the context of a
religious ceremony. 296 It held that free exercise rights do not relieve
one of the obligations imposed by a "valid and neutral law of general
applicability" even where that law prohibits conduct prescribed by the
m See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (ap-
proving legislative grants to schools as constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause).
258 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
289 See id. at 209.
290 See id. at 217-19.
291 See id. at 224-26 (addressing the state's concern for the welfare of Amish children who
may ultimately choose to leave the community); see also Dent, supra note 94, at 711 (charac-
terizing the standard for free exercise claims after Yoder as "a government act that substantially
infringes a sincerely held religious belief is unconstitutional unless justified by a compelling
state interest pursued by the least restrictive means").
292 See, e.g., Frazee v. fllinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829 (1989) (involving
individual who refused to accept position out of personal belief against working on Sunday);
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987) (same); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (concerning Seventh-Day Adventist fired for not working on Saturday and
denied benefits).
293 See supra note 292 (listing cases involving free exercise claims and employment bene-
fits).
294 See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404 (likening the choice to imposing a fine on an individual for
worshipping on the Sabbath).
295 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
296 See id. at 890.
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religion.297 While this appears to reinforce the "neutrality" standard
used in Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it does not end the analy-
sis there. The Smith Court also noted that in some cases, free exercise
principles might even bar the application of a neutral law to relig-
iously motivated conduct if the law also implicates other constitu-
tional rights.298 Thus, where a parent's constitutional right to direct
her child's education combines with free exercise rights, the Smith
corollary may be sidestepped, 299 and challengers may return to the
compelling interest test of Yoder.
Furthermore, the Yoder/Smith standard for free exercise claims
does not end the analysis. Significant debate surrounds the issue of
whether a sectarian education is merely a matter of parental choice or
one of religious practice, thus rising to the level of a fundamental
right. If the right to choose such education is determined to fall
within the realm of the Free Exercise Clause, the question then be-
comes whether the state should, or even can, subsidize the exercise of
that right. The "equal access" theory, as used in the abortion funding
cases, as well as the "unconstitutional conditions" theory provides
insight to answering this question.
A. How Much Exercise Qualifies as a "Fundamental" Under the
Free Exercise Clause?
The Supreme Court has established that one may choose a private,
in this case religious, institution without interference from the gov-
300ernment. Parents may base their choices on any one of many fac-
tors, including the quality of the school, its location, diversity of its
student body and its religious environment. Neither the state nor a
court will delve into the reasons behind that choice in determining its
validity. However, in order to assert this choice, parents must forego
the free public education that is provided by the state, and assume a
significant financial burden that is not imposed on the majority of
parents who do not exercise this option.30' Courts have little sympa-
297 L at 879; see also Dent, supra note 94, at 712 (describing the perceived ramifications of
the Smith decision).
298 See Smith, 494 U.S at 881.
m See Dent, supra note 94, at 714 ("Smith does not preclude free exercise claims by stu-
dents."). It should also be noted that the law at issue in Smith prohibited the use of hallucino-
genic drugs, a "long frowned-[upon]" practice. See id. at 716. Thus its holding should be nar-
rowly interpreted. See id. (noting that Smith was decided at a high point of public outcry over
drug abuse, and the decision was unlikely to effect Jewish and Christian rituals which do not
involve the use of hallucinogenic drugs).
300 See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (establishing the right to send chil-
dren to religious schools); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (establishing compelling
interest standard for free exercise claims).
ml See Viteritti, supra note 6, at 183.
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thy for this plight, often dismissing the choice as purely voluntary,
stating that public education is a government benefit that one is free
to forego.
02
While the right is defined as the right to choose a sectarian educa-
tion, both parents and scholars question the amount of "choice" actu-
ally involved in the decision. In fact, some parents may be unable to
assert the choice either because it is too cost-prohibitive or because a
school that teaches the tenets of their religion is unavailable.0 3 But
for other parents, there may be no "choice" at all because the public
school's curriculum offends their religious values. 304  There is a
somewhat flawed assumption among separationists that public educa-
tion is "value neutral. 30 5 Historically, that has not been the case at
all, as up until this century, Bible readings or group prayer were part
of the public school curriculum in many states.0 6 But more recently,
certain education topics and materials, specifically the teaching of
evolution and sex education, including instruction about AIDS and
homosexuality, have spawned disagreements between parents and
educators regarding the inculcation of values in public schools.3°
Public education is "value laden," but the values supported by the
community school board are not always shared by the community at
large.30 8 For these parents, religious practice and education can not be
separated; part of their faith requires them to provide a religious up-
bringing for their children as a means of maintaining their religious
communities. 309 For governments to treat these parents' decisions as
302 See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788-
89 (1973) ("However great our sympathy... for the burdens experienced by those who must
pay public school taxes at the same time that they support other schools because of the con-
straints of 'conscience and discipline' ... neither may justify an eroding of the limitations of the
Establishment Clause .. ") (citation omitted).
3 See Dent, supra note 94, at 728 (noting that religious education "is unavailable at any
price for small sects who have not established religious schools").
304 See Viteritti, supra note 6, at 183. For example, Orthodox Jewish parents who do not
desire their children to attend a mandatory sex-education class, as they believe it to be immoral,
have no alternative but to send their children elsewhere. See id. at 182.
305 See Dent, supra note 94, at 709 n.21 (citing authorities who question whether public
education can be "value-neutral"); Viteritti, supra note 6, at 178 (explaining how values shape
the character of schools and how separationist ideas are premised on faulty assumptions).
306 See, e.g., Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (holding that Bible
reading in public schools is unconstitutional); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding that
mandatory school prayer is unconstitutional).
307 See Dent, supra note 94, at 709.
308 See Viteritti, supra note 6, at 182. In some situations, such as education about homo-
sexuality, public schools make no effort to be neutral or even-handed. See Dent, supra note 94,
at 710 (explaining how some public schools portray homosexuality as acceptable, and ignore the
alternative views held by a large portion of society).
309 See Viteritti, supra note 6, at 186 ("Education is the route through which religious and
moral values are imparted to the child."). Similarly, the Yoder Court found that the Amish faith
and way of life were inseparable and independent, not merely a matter of personal preference.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 ,215 (1972) (stating that the Amish would be forced to
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merely ones of preference is not only suspect, but unrealistic. Public
education is neither "voluntary ' 310 nor is it a benefit which is easily
foregone out of some personal "Thoreau-like" rejection of seemingly
"secular" values.311
How do these misconceptions of "choice" and "value neutrality"
in education affect the application of the Smith standard? The fact
that some religions may encourage, and even expect, parents to pro-
vide a religious education for their children may be dwarfed by the
state's interest in providing them with a "neutral" education. How-
ever, the combination of the fundamental rights to free exercise and to
direct one's child's education may supercede any anti-establishment
interest that the state may have.312 This argument is strengthened by
the proposition that public education may not be "neutral" in its em-
phasis on secularism. As stated repeatedly by the Supreme Court:
"[Tihe First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between
religion and religion, and between religion and non-religion."
313
Thus, the infringement of two fundamental rights, combined with a
state's possible encouragement of secularism, could fail the Smith
"neutrality" standard, as well as the "compelling interest" requirement
of Yoder, so as to violate the Free Exercise Clause.
B. Subsidizing Free Exercise
It has now been established that the right to choose a religious
education for one's child is fundamental and in some cases, that
"choice" actually becomes a form of religious practice that is also
protected as a free exercise right. In the application of this theory to
the voucher programs currently being litigated, the question then be-
comes whether the state can or must subsidize the exercise of this
right, specifically by allowing religious schools to participate in
voucher programs or other forms of government aid. Two theories
are useful in resolving this question. The "equal access" theory,
314
choose between migration or allowing their children to become part of outside society). In
Yoder, the Court was also concerned that compulsory education could "undermin[e] the Amish
community . I.." d. at 218; see also Dent, supra note 94, at 738 ("[Ihe survival of religious
communities is necessary to make the religious freedom of individuals 'both possible and
meaningful.' The education of children is crucial to this survival .... To survive, religious
groups depend on raising their members' children within the faith .... [G]overnment [should]
forebear from unnecessarily weakening religious communities.") (citation omitted).310 See Dent, supra note 94, at 728 n.118 (citing Ohio's compulsory education law).
31 See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216 (noting that if the Amish were simply rejecting the social
values of their time as Thoreau had, their claims would have no religious basis).312 See Dent, supra note 94, at 715 (explaining that Smith may provide for parental free ex-
ercise rights beyond those espoused in Yoder and Pierce).313 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).
314 See generally Melvyn R. Durchslag, Constraints on Equal Access to Fundamental Lib-
erties: Another Look at Professor Michelman's Theory of Minimum Protection, 19 GA. L. REV.
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often applied in the equal protection context, demonstrates that the
state or other government body should insure that parents and chil-
dren are not inhibited in their free exercise/educational directive
rights by economic or other forces. Secondly, the "unconstitutional
conditions" theory315 states that state governments may be abridging
parents' exercise of these rights by excluding religious schools from
such programs.
1. Equal Access to Fundamental Liberties
Proponents of aid to religious schools have what appears to be a
simple argument: the government can not charge for the enjoyment of
a constitutional right.316 Because parents of parochial school students
pay taxes to support public schools that they do not use, as well as
tuition to the parochial school, they are being "charged" extra by the
state for exercising their fundamental rights to free exercise in di-
recting their child's education. It is this very "charge" which impedes
some low-income parents from exercising these rights. This is the
rationale underlying the "equal access" theory; once a right is defined
as fundamental, a court (specifically, the Supreme Court as we are
dealing with federal constitutional rights) "must ensure that everyone
has access to the enjoyment of that right ... even if that means that
others must make some sacrifice to realize that access. 3 11
The Supreme Court has been quick to apply this theory to compel
states to subsidize activities in the areas of due process318 and voting
rights.3t9 On the other hand, the access issue was virtually ignored in
a series of abortion funding cases. 320 These decisions are further sup-
ported by the decision in Regan v. Taxation with Representation,
321
one of several cases in which the Court has held that the government
1041 (1985) (arguing for the Supreme Court to adopt a rule of equal access to fundamental
rights).
315 See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L REV.
1413, 1415 (1989) (defining unconstitutional conditions as: "when government conditions a
benefit on the recipients waiver of a preferred liberty").
316 See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113 (1943).
317 Durchslag, supra note 314, at 1044.
318 See, e.g., Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (requiring state to pay for blood tests in
paternity suits for child-support purposes); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (striking
down fee imposed for filing divorce petition).
319 See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (striking down filing fees imposed on
candidates wishing to appear on primary ballot); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S.
663 (1966) (striking down a poll tax).320 See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding prohibition on the use of Ti-
tle X funds for abortion counseling or referral); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1989) (upholding prohibition on abortions performed in public hospitals); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding prohibition against the use of Medicaid funds for abor-
tions); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (same).
321 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
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has no obligation to subsidize the exercise of fundamental rights. 322
These decisions further hold that a legislative decision not to subsi-
dize the exercise of a fundamental right is not an infringement on that
right,323 nor is the refusal to fund equivalent to a "penalty" on unde-
sirable behavior, in those cases, choosing to have an abortion.324
Furthermore, in several of these decisions, the Court has held that the
failure of the state or federal government to fund abortions is not an
obstacle to the exercise of the right, but merely acts to encourage al-
ternatives deemed to be in the public interest, specifically child-
birth.3z
These sweeping tenets of constitutional theory would appear to
sound the "death knell" for free exercise claims in the educational aid
context. 326 However, these cases may be distinguished from the
voucher controversy on two levels: one, a purely textual analysis, and
the other, a theory of constitutional history. These differences pro-
vide insight into the usefulness of free exercise claims in the voucher
context while also freeing them from the seemingly harsh precedent
set forth in these abortion cases. 3
27
The Supreme Court has repeatedly supported its decision to up-
hold prohibitions on abortion funding by stating that the state or fed-
eral government is not impeding abortion, but simply encouraging
childbirth.32 In doing so, the government effectively denies funding
of one fundamental right-abortion-while at the same time specifi-
cally providing for another fundamental right-childbirth. The
government is not asked to provide any explanation for why one right
is favored over another, 33 an approach that runs counter to the very
idea that "fundamental values" must be protected from overreaching
majoritarian interests.131
Without addressing possible error in the abortion funding deci-
322 See i& at 545.
321 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 193; Regan, 461 U.S. at 54. In McRae, the use of Medicaid funds
for abortions was banned. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 302. As such, Medicaid recipients, by defi-
nition, would be unable to pay the price for a private abortion, yet that fact was deemed irrele-
vant as any restriction on the women's freedom to choose was a "product not of governmental
restrictions on access to abortions, but rather of her indigency." lId at 316.324 See Rust, 500 U.S at 193; McRae, 448 U.S. at 317 n.19.32S See McRae, 448 U.S. at 315.32 See Dent, supra note 94, at 712.
327 See supra note 320 (listing rejections of equal access claims in the abortion context).
321 See McRae, 448 U.S. at 315.
329 See Durchslag, supra note 314, at 1052.
330 See id. (suggesting that a state could justify this choice by opining that "we like one bet-
ter than the other").
331 See id. at 1058. ("Strict scrutiny... to protect fundamental values is ... the Court's
recognition that certain individual interests must be removed from normal political cost-benefit
or interest balancing.").
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sions, educational aid can be distinguished from this precedent.
There is no fundamental right to education in general. What, then, is
the other fundamental right the state is attempting to weigh against
free exercise? 332 Some courts have held that Establishment Clause
concerns outweigh an individual's free exercise rights.333 The con-
flict between these two provisions is not as easily reconciled. In the
abortion funding cases, the state was free to encourage childbirth over
abortion and could use its fiscal and regulatory power to do so. But is
a state free to encourage a secular education over a sectarian one, and
then use its taxation power to do so? The Establishment Clause
would appear to forbid such action. To give preference to nonbe-
lievers over believers of any faith is as offensive to First Amendment
values as a state preferring one sect over another.334 By making pub-
lic schools, which are seemingly non-religious institutions, "free" to
their users, while religious schools must charge a fee for tuition, the
state seems to be indirectly encouraging a secular education. 35 The
Supreme Court has held that a government can not establish a "relig-
ion of secularism" in an attempt to be religiously neutral.3 36 If public
schools are not value neutral and, in some instances, are actually hos-
tile to one's religious beliefs, favoring these schools through financial
incentives may violate the very anti-establishment principles that aid
prohibitions are designed to protect. On the other hand, while there
was no constitutional prohibition on advocating marriage, family and
childbirth at issue in the abortion cases, there is a prohibition on ad-
vocating religion, which may lead to the conclusion that the abortion
funding cases and their rationale are not binding on this issue.
Also, while the Court does not say so explicitly, perhaps we are
seeing the establishment of a hierarchy of constitutional values.337
The Court has articulated such a hierarchy in the area of free speech
rights, holding that commercial speech may be regulated more perva-
332 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
33 See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,788 (1973)
("It is true, of course, that this Court has long recognized and maintained the right to choose
nonpublic over public education. It is also true that a state law interfering with a parent's right
to [such a choice] would run afoul the Free Exercise Clause. But this Court repeatedly has
recognized that tension inevitably exists between the Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses.") (citations omitted); Miller v. Benson, 878 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (E.D. Wis. 1995)
(declaring that the present state of First Amendment jurisprudence compels the finding that
tuition reimbursements to students attending private religious schools violates the Establishment
Clause); Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., No. S0478-96, at 6 (Vt. Super.
Ct. June 27, 1997); Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407, 423 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).334 See Stick, supra note 2, at 465.
335 See Dent, supra note 94, at 752.
336 See Stick, supra note 2, at 465 (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963)).
337 See Durchslag, supra note 314, at 1063.
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sively than noncommercial speech,338 and that political speech is
more protected than other forms of speech, such as erotic expres-
sion.339 This unstated hierarchy, combined with the Court's 'apparent
preference for specific due process and voting rights over those aris-
ing out of the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights,340 may imply that so-
ciety places a premium on certain "democratic values., 3 4 1 If this is
so, religious rights, because they are enumerated in the Constitution
and do not arise out of the extension of other general rights, would
appear to be more protected than perhaps abortion rights or commer-
cial speech.342 Granted, there are many issues that arise from the idea
that some rights are more fundamental than others, particularly in the
free exercise context. The fact that the right of religious freedom
"ranks" higher than other rights, however, may nonetheless imply that
there exists a governmental obligation to subsidize the exercise of
those rights beyond what is necessary for the exercise of "less funda-
mental" penumbral rights.
2. Unconstitutional Conditions
A second theory that may support an obligation by the government
to subsidize the exercise of free exercise rights is the "unconstitu-
tional conditions" theory.343 This theory is based on the notion that
the government may not do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing
directly.3 4 That is, if the government can not force an individual to
surrender certain fundamental rights through legislation, then neither
can it "coerce" such a surrender by conditioning the receipt of gov-
ernment benefits. 345 This "coercion" arises in cases involving rights
that depend on the exercise of autonomous choice, specifically free
speech, rights to privacy and free exercise.346 It may appear in any
333 See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490,504-05 (1981).
339 See Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976).340 See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,470 (1977).
4' See Durchslag, supra note 314, at 1063.342 See id. at 1063 n.90.
343 See generally RICHARD EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE (1993); Sullivan, supra
note 315, at 1428-56 (describing such conditions as a form of unconstitutional coercion).
3" See Sullivan, supra note 315, at 1415. The converse of this theory is the idea that "the
greater includes the lesser." See Michael E. Hartmann, Cleaning Up with Banquo's Ghost in the
Dairyland? A Brief (Economic) Analysis of the Milvaukee Parental Choice Program's Uncon-
stitutional Conditioning of its Aid on an Effective Waiver of a Recipient's Free Exercise of
Religion: Professor Richard A. Epstein's Bargaining with the State and Miller v. Benson, 27
AKRON L REV. 445, 447-48 (1994). That is, if the government has the power to completely
deny some benefit, it also has the power to condition its receipt. See id.
34 See Sullivan, supra note 315, at 1415.
346 See id. at 1426. There is some question as to how much "choice" is involved in some
free exercise activities. See supra Part IV(A) (describing how religious education can be a free
exercise right) when compared to other constitutional rights, based on immutable characteris-
tics such as race or gender, the free exercise of one's religious beliefs falls into the "voluntary"
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one of three forms. Where it appears as if the government is using a
benefit to "coerce" individuals into not exercising their rights, by, for
example, instituting a fine on the activity, the benefit becomes an un-
constitutional deterrent.347 Such "coercion" may also take the form of
a penalty, as when the individual must sacrifice the benefit in order to
exercise the right.348 This was the theory behind the employment
cases discussed above in which employees were forced to forego un-
employment benefits in order to comply with their religious belief of
not working on the Sabbath.349 Lastly, coercion may result from the
choice itself where, for instance, the receipt of a benefit and the
waiver a right, or the exercise of a right and the surrender of a benefit
will leave the individual in an undesirable position regardless of
which is chosen.350
When a parent is given a voucher or aid from a related program,
while being prohibited from using that voucher to send their child to a
sectarian school, this arguably amounts to the state unconstitutionally
conditioning that aid on the parent's waiver of her free exercise
rights.351 Again, the Supreme Court's decisions in the abortion fund-
ing cases indicate that while those cases were determined not to be
unconstitutional conditions, the constitutionality of such voucher re-
strictions may be different. In the abortion funding cases, the Court
did not address whether certain funding prohibitions deterred lower-
income women who could not afford abortions from having abortions
in the first place.352 The Court held that these women were not "co-
erced" into bearing children, which would have been a violation of
their constitutional reproductive rights. 3
The same can not be said of parents who feel that part of their re-
ligious practice involves providing their children with a religious edu-
cation. Because of compulsory education laws, if these parents do not
have the financial means to go elsewhere, they must participate in the
public school system. When vouchers enter the picture, the deterrent
effect intensifies. Parents are forced to send their children to school,
category for purposes of this doctrine. See Sullivan, supra note 315, at 1426.
47 See Sullivan, supra note 315, at 1435 (discussing the definition of "coercion" as estab-
lished by several Supreme Court cases).
48 See id. at 1435-36.
349 See supra notes 292-99 and accompanying text (discussing free exercise claims in the
employee benefits context).
350 See Sullivan, supra note 315, at 1436 ("[U]nconstitutional conditions pose a 'choice
between the rock and the whirlpool."') (quoting Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583,593 (1926).
351 See Hartmann, supra note 344, at 446 (discussing whether states can attach conditions to
grants of school aid).
352 See Sullivan, supra note 315, at 1440.
353 See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991); see also Sullivan, supra note 315, at
1440 (noting that cases decided prior to Rust did not even address this issue).
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so when parochial schools are excluded, this makes their religious
choice less practical as well as less desirable. Women seeking abor-
tions, whether or not impoverished, are not forced to participate in the
public health system. Other state welfare programs or private solu-
tions may be available to her, regardless of her financial means.
While this does not imply that such women have "plenty" of op-
tions 4 they do have significantly more options than parents who are
constrained not only by financial concerns, but also by legal require-
ments.
Conditioning educational aid on the waiver of one's free exercise
rights is arguably unconstitutional, especially if one considers that the
consequences of such conditions amount to "penalties." In the em-
ployment cases,355 the Supreme Court held that the denial of unem-
ployment benefits to those who were unemployed because they re-
fused to work on the Sabbath was akin to fining someone for Sabbath
worship.356 The denial of the benefit penalized the employees for
their religious beliefs. Conversely, the Court held in the abortion
funding cases that the denial of funding was not a penalty, but merely
a "nonsubsidy" or "selective subsidization" to encourage childbirth.357
The distinction between a penalty and a nonsubsidy relies on the
baseline or status quo from which the benefit or denial is to be as-
sessed.358 In the abortion funding cases, the Court repeatedly de-
clared that despite various funding provisions, pregnant women
seeking abortions have the same choices they would have had were
the state or federal government to choose not to fund health costs at
all.359 Similarly, in the educational aid context, courts have consis-
tently upheld the denial of aid to religious schools on the grounds that
the parents have the same choices they would have had were the'state
to choose not to provide the aid at all.36 Thus, courts define the
baseline as "no government funding of non-public schools," much
like the abortion decisions define the baseline as "no funding of
354 See Dent, supra note 94, at 722 (suggesting that while private abortion counseling is
prohibitively expensive only for the poorest citizens, "private schooling is unattainable for most
Americans").355 See supra notes 296-99 and accompanying text.
356 See Hartmann, supra note 344, at 461 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404
(1963)).
317 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 201; Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315-17 (1980); Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464,475 (1977).
358 See Dent, supra note 94, at 724 n.98 (noting that the status quo is often erroneously used
as the baseline); Sullivan, supra note 315, at 1440.
3.9 See Rust, 500 U.S. at 202; McRae, 448 U.S. at 317; see also Webster v. Reproductive
Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1989) (noting that under the prohibition on abortions in public
hospitals, women were left with the same options they would have been were the state to choose
not to operate any public hospitals).
3o See Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407,423 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
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health care., 36 1 Is this an accurate assessment of the "baseline" from
which the benefits begin or is this merely a statement of the status
quo? Prior to the creation of any educational choice program, this
may be a true and accurate baseline, as neither parents of sectarian
and secular private-school students receive the benefit of free or sub-
sidized education. However, once a plan is implemented that applies
to nonsectarian private schools, that baseline shifts from funding of
public schools only to funding of all schools except religious
schools. 362 It is from this baseline that the "penalty" is imposed, as
those who exercise their religious rights are denied an expensive
benefit, free education, solely because of that exercise.363
The educational aid issue also provides an interesting illustration
of unconstitutional conditioning through the "coercive choice" that it
creates.364 This is especially true when the government has monopo-
listic control over supplying the benefit, as it does in the case of pub-
lic elementary education.365 The state, through its compulsory educa-
tion laws, essentially requires a parent to purchase a good, the stu-
dent's education, while systematically making itself the "lowest-cost
provider" of that good. Once secular school vouchers or other choice
plans enter into the picture, the "choice" practically disappears. By
limiting vouchers or other public educational aid to secular schools
only, the government forces parents to choose between following
their faith by sending their children to religious schools, and forfeiting
government benefits in the form of vouchers or other funds.366 Legal
economists describe this as a redistribution of wealth from religious
persons to non-religious persons, as those who would have used
vouchers for parochial schooling now can not, while those vouchers
361 See Dent, supra note 94, at 724 n.98; Sullivan, supra note 315, at 1440.
362 See generally, Sullivan, supra note 315, at 1440 (noting that proper baseline for abortion
cases would actually be the funding of all medical expenses for reproduction except abortions).
In an economic analysis of unconstitutional conditions using the "Pareto optimum" test, the
baseline for measuring changes in social welfare is not the original status quo (funding only for
public education), but the post-change status (the imposition of a choice plan). See Hartmann,
supra note 344, at 452. The imposition of an unconstitutional condition-i.e., excluding relig-
ious schools-then affects the social welfare from the post-change status under the choice plan.
See id.
36 See Dent, supra note 94, at 724 n.98 (discussing the dangers of reliance on the use of the
status quo as a baseline).
361 See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926) (analo-
gizing such a choice to that between a rock and a whirlpool).
365 See Sullivan, supra note 315, at 1452-53. Property taxation combined with subsidization
of elementary education narrows the private market alternatives available. See id. at 1453 n.160.
While this choice itself may amount to an unconstitutional condition, the scope of this Note is
limited to conditions that arise from voucher plans or other aid, not the educational finance
system as a whole.
366 See Hartmann, supra note 344, at 471-72 (arguing that states are unconstitutionally bar-
gaining away individuals' rights to freedom of religion).
[Vol. 49:747
AGOSTINI v. FELTON
remain available to those who will use it for private secular
schools. 367  This is very often the case for low-income families, a
group that was the focus of both the Milwaukee and Cleveland
voucher programs.368 Unfortunately, that same group lacks the politi-
cal and economic power to avoid the dilemma in which they are
placed by the state.36 9 In fact, by creating this dichotomy, the state
may actually be forcing religious families to forfeit benefits in order
to subsidize those parents who will use the secular schools.370 This
creates a disincentive to use sectarian schools, which in most consti-
tutional areas, is considered discriminatory and unconstitutional.371
C. Free Exercise: Underutilized or Unsuccessful?
Given the practical and judicial support for some of these argu-
ments, why are free exercise claims seemingly underutilized in edu-
cational funding litigation, especially where voucher programs are at
issue? There are several possible explanations ranging from recent
modifications in religious freedom analysis, to a reluctance to prefer
one set of rights over another, to simple supervisory concerns by sec-
tarian institutions should these claims succeed.
The United States District Court for the Eastern Division of Wis-
consin is one of the few tribunals to directly address a free exercise
claim made by individuals. In Miller v. Benson,3 72 five Milwauke
parents filed suit to order the state to include sectarian schools in the
original MPCP, 373 claiming that their exclusion was a deprivation of
their free exercise rights. 374 While the Miller court took note of the
m See EPSTEI, supra note 343, at 261 (applying economic analysis to unconstitutional
conditions); Hartmann, supra note 344, at 466. When the redistribution runs the other way,
from the nonreligious to the religious, an Establishment Clause violation results. See EPsTEIN,
supra note 343, at 261.
mSee supra Part l(A) & (B).
369 See Hartmann, supra note 344, at 472 ("[The state has] even more heavy-handed undue
leverage over [low-income families] and their free exercise rights.")
370 See id at 471-72.
371 See id. at 471 n.129 ("For the government to subsidize some private schools but refuse to
subsidize the religious ones would make religious schools more costly and would thus constitute
a government-created disincentive to use them. In other areas of constitutional law, we do not
call such disincentives 'neutrality'; we call them 'discrimination."') (quoting STEPHEN L.
CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERIcAN LAW AND POLmcs TRVIALIZEs
RELIGIOUS DEVOTION 200 (1993)). Equal protection claims such as this one, while the subject
of significant scholarly debate, are not addressed here.
372 878 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. Wis.), vacated, 68 F.3d 163 (7th Cir. 1995).
3n The original MPCP was limited to public and nonsectarian private schools. See id. at
1209. The 1995 amendments expanding the program to include sectarian schools upheld
against and Establishment Clause challenge in light of Agostini. See Jackson v. Benson, 578
N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 466 (1998); see also supra notes 125-151 and
accompanying text (describing the Wisconsin Supreme Court's reasoning in upholding the
program).
374 See Miller, 878 F. Supp. at 1212.
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fact that the parents had a constitutional right to choose religious edu-
cation for their children, they focused on traditional Establishment
Clause analysis to deny the parents' requests.3 75 Relying heavily on
Nyquist, the court held that including religious schools in the MPCP
would fail to satisfy the "effects" prong of the Lemon test, and thus
result in an Establishment Clause violation that overwhelmed the
Plaintiffs' free exercise rights.3 76 There was no further discussion on
appeal, as by that time, the MPCP had been amended to include re-
ligious schools, thus rendering the free exercise claim moot.
3 77
Is resurrection a possibility for such claims in light of Agostini?
The Miller court focused on the Nyquist assumption that direct pay-
ments to religious schools is a per se violation of the Establishment
Clause.378 As explained above, that assumption was explicitly rejected
in the Agostini decision. 79 While Agostini may not alter the final
disposition of a free exercise claim, courts would nonetheless be
forced to consider the Free Exercise Clause as it did in the employ-
ment cases discussed above,380 rather than simply dismissing the
claim on the ground that a per se Establishment Clause violation ex-
ists. It should be noted, however, that the Wisconsin Supreme Court
Jackson did have an opportunity to address a free exercise claim post-
Agostini, but chose to analyze it under Establishment Clause reason-
ing, finding no need to address the free exercise claim.38 1
The court of appeals in Jackson highlighted another difficult issue
in free exercise claims, stating: "We fail to see why the original pro-
gram represents any more of a curtailment by the State of the... de-
fendants' free exercise rights than would be the case had the original
program not been enacted., 38 2 This signaled a return to the theory that
sectarian education is one of preference rather than one of obligation,
and that funding prohibitions are merely non-subsidies, not penal-
ties. 83 But by expecting, and in some instances requiring, individuals
to marginalize religious convictions, courts may be displaying hostil-
375 See id at 1212-16.
376 See id. at 1213 (stating that "it may not be possible to promote [the Free Exercise
Clause] without offending the [Establishment Clause]") (quoting Committee for Pub. Educ. &
Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,788 (1973)).
377 See Miller, 68 F.3d at 165.
378 See id. at 1216.
379 See supra Part II(A). The district court in Miller was aware of the possibility that Ny-
quist would be overruled or modified, yet it chose not to speculate in its own decision. See
Miller, 878 F. Supp. at 1216.
380 See supra notes 296-99.381See Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 620 n. 19 (Wis. 1998).
382 Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407,423 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
383 See supra Part IV(B)(2) (describing unconstitutional conditions theory that denying
funding to certain activities is merely subsidization and not penalization).
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ity to religion indirectly.384 While the Nyquist Court did not see such
exclusion this way,385 recent decisions of the Supreme Court indicate
a shift in favor of accommodation of all religions (including secular
ones) over separationism. 386
Even in light of the changing landscape of Establishment Clause
jurisprudence, free exercise claims confront courts with an impossible
choice between which right is superior, freedom from religion or
freedom of religion.387 The courts must subordinate one religion
clause to another in order to arrive at a decision. The limited number
of courts to address this quandary were quick to dismiss plaintiffs'
free exercise claims as having been superceded by a potential Estab-
lishment Clause violation.388 However, the Smith standard would ap-
pear to require a more stringent analysis when numerous fundamental
rights are involved.3 89 Even under such an analysis it is not so clear
which clause prevails.
The argument favoring the Establishment Clause is obvious.
While parents certainly have the right to send their children to relig-
ious schools, that right need not be subsidized by the state.390 As dis-
cussed previously, free exercise rights are not impinged any more by
a state's refusal to fund religious education than if the state had cho-
sen not to fund that education at all.391 Additionally, in excluding
sectarian schools, states are not attempting to promote secularism, but
are merely trying to remain neutral as not all religions have the com-
munity support to operate their own schools.392 Furthermore, by ex-
cluding religious schools from the analysis, states are avoiding further
free exercise problems in defining "religion" under the First Amend-
384 See Viteritti, supra note 6, at 186; see also Dent, supra note 94, at 726 (indicating that
for some sects religion is pervasive, making every action a religiously significant one).
38 See Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788-89
(1973) ("However great our sympathy for the burdens experienced by those who must pay pub-
lic schools taxes at the same time that they support other schools because of the constraints of
'conscience and discipline,' ... [it still does not] justify an eroding of the limitations of the
Establishment Clause now firmly implanted.") (citations omitted).
386 See Viteritti, supra note 6, at 190 (describing an equality model of religious freedom that
incorporates the Free Exercise Clause with the Equal Protection Clause to address school
choice); see also Dent, supra note 94, at 752 (concluding that accommodation is the key to
easing the "agonizing choice between education and faith").
87 See Michael McConnell, Religious Participation in Public Programs: Religious Free-
dom at the Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L REV. 115, 116 (1992) (criticizing the Warren and Burger
courts for favoring secularism over religious tolerance).
388 See Miller v. Benson, 878 F. Supp. 1209, 1216 (E.D. Wis. 1995), vacated, 68 F.3d 163
(7th Cir. 1995); Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407, 423 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998); Chittenden
Town Sch. Dist. v. Vermont Dep't of Educ., No. S0478-96, at 6 (Vt. Super. Ct. June 27, 1997).
39 See, e.g., supra Part IV(A) (describing compelling interest test of Yoder as applied in
Snith).
390 See Stick, supra note 2, at 465.
31 See Jackson, 570 N.W.2d at 423.
392 See Stick, supra note 2, at 465.
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ment. Once the state chooses to subsidize religious education, it must
then address what schools qualify as "religious. 393 To avoid these
complications, courts simply side with the idea that the Establishment
Clause is supreme.
Some academics have posited that the argument is a much more
complicated one. They argue that rights guaranteed to the individual,
such as those provided under the Free Exercise Clause, should be em-
phasized over threats posed to those rights of religious institutions in
the form of Establishment Clause violations.394 The principles un-
derlying the religion clauses, that of religious pluralism and diversity,
requires that "[w]henever both religion clauses are potentially rele-
vant, . . .the dominance of the free exercise clause follows from
[those] principles." 395 The Court's recent shift to a neutrality assess-
ment may also give greater weight to free exercise principles. In the
Rosenberger decision, the Court weighed free speech and free exer-
cise principles against the Establishment Clause, and held in favor of
the former.39 6 As aptly stated by Justice Thomas in his concurrence,
"[t]he [Establishment] Clause does not compel the exclusion of re-
ligious groups from government benefits programs that are generally
available to a broad class of participants. 397 A neutrality approach at
least would require sensitivity to both types of claims.398 Neutrality
also affects the underlying presumptions that have thus far given the
Establishment Clause its precedence, one presumption being that
public education is value neutral.399 That is, a state justifies its in-
fringement on religious freedom by claiming that it is promoting
"neutral" and secular education. As public education is rarely "value-
neutral" and its secularism may actually compete with religion,'
400
then the state's interest in such pseudo-neutrality could become sub-
ordinate to free exercise principles under a true neutrality analysis.
The potential success of free exercise claims in the area of educa-
tional funding is subject to debate. One certainty, however, is that
were these claims to succeed, thus requiring voucher programs to in-
corporate religious schools, such success would not come without
393 See Wayne McCormack, Subsidies for Expression and the Future of Free Exercise, 1993
BYU L. REv. 327,340 (1993).
394 See Viteritti, supra note 6, at 142.
395 TRIBE, supra note 69, § 14-8, at 1204; cf. Dent, supra note 94, at 719 ("One can justify a
greater sensitivity to establishment claims than to free exercise claims only if the religion
clauses are viewed as promoting secularism.").
396 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 839 (1995).
397 Id. at 861 (Thomas, J., concurring).
398 See Dent, supra note 94, at 719.
399 See supra notes 303-313 and accompanying text (discussing the myth of public schools
being value neutral).
400 See McConnell, supra note 387, at 190-91.
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strings attached. Government money does not come without govern-
ment rules. 40 Such rules could include compliance with certain state
or federal discrimination policies, health and safety provisions4°2 as
well as standardized curricula and performance tests. 403 Such rules
would reduce the time available for religious teaching in parochial
schools and may create heated conflicts in ideology.4°4 While ac-
commodationists are quick to point out that schools would always
have the option to refuse government aid in light of such conflicts,405
such rejection is politically unrealistic. 406 Perhaps this is the unspo-
ken reason behind the underutilization of free exercise claims in the
educational funding area.
V. CONCLUSION
When Milton Friedman first proposed an educational voucher
system in 1955, it was purely based on economic theory and did not
account for legal principles or social issues. Vouchers were not pro-
posed as a subversive means to strengthen religious groups or inun-
date society with religious values. Rather, they were proposed as a
means of equalizing educational opportunities across income strata.
Whether this theory will be effective as it was when first proposed by
Friedman probably never will be known.
The Establishment Clause had historically been considered fatal to
any voucher program including sectarian schools. However, in light
of Agostini, that threat has been diminished. The presumption of re-
ligious inculcation and the standing prohibition on any direct aid have
been rejected. Separationism has been exchanged for a more flexible
neutrality analysis, one that incorporates broad classes of beneficiar-
ies and independent choice to protect religious freedoms. Voucher
programs may be resurrected given that the flaws that once were fatal,
now appear to be irrelevant under the new Agostini analysis.
State courts, on the other hand, are not required to be as kind.
Vouchers will continue to be challenged under more restrictive state
constitutional provisions. Under the principles of federalism princi-
ples, such challenges can easily succeed as illustrated by the Wiscon-
sin case. These courts will need to be cautious of disregarding federal
decisions, lest they tread on individual free exercise rights in the pro-
401 See Futterman, supra note 8, at 735 (citation omitted).
4o2 Compliance in both of these areas was required under the MPCP. See Jackson v. Benson,
570 N.W.2d 407,412 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997).
403 See Futterman, supra note 8, at 736.
404 See id. at 737. For example, a national curriculum could require the teaching of evolu-
tion in science classes. See id.
405 See iL at 739 n.198.4
06 See iL at 739.
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cess. Herein lies the new direction for vouchers under the First
Amendment. The fundamental free exercise right, combined with
parents' traditional right to direct their children's education, creates a
need for a compelling reasons to justify state infringement. In fact,
this combination may exceed even anti-establishment concerns.
Just as Friedman's 40-year-old proposal is still debated today, so,
too, will the constitutionality of that proposal in the years following
the Agostini decision. Friedman's promise of educational efficiency
and opportunity still remains empty. Perhaps under Agostini, the
Constitution's promise and protection of religious freedom can be
fulfilled.
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